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MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE FLOW CONTROL
IN THE POST-CARBONE WORLD
Eric S. Petersen*
David N. Abramowitz**
I. Introduction
To deal most effectively and efficiently with the public health
and safety problems associated with solid waste and its collection,
management and disposal, governments in the United States often
have sponsored both governmental and privatized solid waste management facilities.' These facilities are financed through a variety
of methods, running the gamut from put-or-pay contracts between
a private owner and a local government,2 to general obligation debt
used to finance the construction of a facility, to project-specific revenue obligations of a governmental unit.3 Many of these financing
options rely upon the delivery of solid waste, whether in the form
of garbage, recyclables, compostables, construction and demolition
debris, or other types of unwanted material, to the facility to gener* Partner, Hawkins, Delafield & Wood, J.D., 1973, University of Chicago Law
School. New York-based Hawkins, Delafield & Wood has maintained a national public finance practice for over a century. Mr. Petersen has been instrumental in developing the firm's environmental facilities privatization practice, with special emphasis
in solid waste disposal facilities development, procurement and contract negotiations,
and is nationally recognized as a leader in the field. Mr. Petersen has served as bond
counsel, underwriters' counsel and contract negotiating counsel in over forty-five
solid waste transactions and was a principal author of two amicus curiae briefs in
support of the respondent in the U.S. Supreme Court case C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994). He was also involved, in an advisory
role, with Congressional efforts to authorize legislative flow control.
** Associate, Hawkins, Delafield & Wood, J.D., 1992, Boston University School
of Law. Mr. Abramowitz is an associate in the firm's project finance group, concentrating primarily in the field of solid waste management, and assisted in authoring an
amicus curiae brief in support of the respondent in the U.S. Supreme Court case C &
A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
1. See generally Eric Petersen, WHOSE WASTE IS IT ANYWAY? ASSURING FLOW
CONTROL FOR MUNICIPAL WASTE PROCESSING FACILITIES (1993) [hereinafter,
WHOSE WASTE IS IT ANYWAY?] (discussing the origins of local government flow control measures and flow control in general).
2. In short, put-or-pay contracts obligate the government to deliver a specified
amount of waste each year. In the event that the government fails to meet this obligation, it is still required to pay the tipping fee for the shortage. See infra notes 45-51
and accompanying text.
3. Warren T. Gregory, et al., Economics and Financing of Resource Recovery
Projects,in THE SOLID WASTE HANDBOOK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE 121 (W. Robinson

ed. 1986).
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ate revenues to pay off outstanding debt or to fulfill the govern4
ment's delivery obligations under a put-or-pay contract.
Recently, governments have relied upon a variety of types of
flow5 control to ensure that waste is delivered to the desired facility. Flow control is the ability to control where waste originating
in a certain area is transported, processed or disposed. Until recently, flow control was most often achieved through legislative
means, in other words, through the adoption and enforcement of
ordinances requiring all collectors and haulers of solid waste operating in the jurisdiction to dispose of such waste at a designated.
site.6
After years of challenging such legislative flow control ordinances with generally unsuccessful results, the haulers scored an
important victory in May of 1994, when the United States Supreme
Court, in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,7 struck down
a flow control ordinance as violative of the Commerce Clause 8 of
the United States Constitution. The loss of the ability to engage in
legislative flow control has endangered the economic stability of
solid waste facilities constructed to protect the public health and
safety whose financing was supported by flow control laws, and
could also lead to increased environmental risks and liabilities for
local governments and their taxpayers. Faced with the inability to
determine legislatively where waste will be disposed, governments
have turned to Congress for authorization to engage in legislative
flow control. With private waste management companies aggressively lobbying for severely limited grants of authority, however,
governments will be forced to consider alternative means of
achieving solid waste flow control in order to achieve their public
purpose goals in solid waste management.
This Article addresses the solid waste management options available to the governmental sector to ensure the delivery of solid
4. See, e.g., Central Iowa Refuse System v. Des Moines Metro. Solid Waste
Agency, 715 F.2d 419, 422 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985); Hybud
Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1188-89 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated on
other grounds, 455 U.S. 931 (1982).
5. See generally Martin E. Gold, Solid Waste Management and the Constitution's
Commerce Clause, 25 URB. LAW. 21 (1993) (suggesting judicial restraint in applying
the Constitution to solid waste management problems and calling for Congressional
authorization of flow control).
6. See generally State & Local Government Solid Waste Management § 7.08
(1992 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the uses of flow control ordinances in connection
with the development of solid waste facilities).
7. 114 S.Ct. 1677 (1994).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE CONTROL

1995]

waste on a long-term basis to specific facilities sponsored by the
government in light of the Carbone decision. Part II discusses in
detail the role played by flow control in solid waste management
and solid waste project financings. Part III presents a synopsis of
the historical legal challenges to the governmental flow control
power, focusing especially on the constitutional issues involved,
and tracing the Commerce Clause challenges prior to Carbone. In
Part IV, the Carbone decision is analyzed and the actual and theoretical impact of the decision is assessed. Part V presents four alternative methods by which governments can likely achieve the
effect of legal flow control without running afoul of Carbone, and
Part VI examines recent Congressional efforts to authorize legislative legal flow control in certain limited circumstances.
II.

Solid Waste Management and Flow Control-Based
Financings

A.

State and Local Management of Solid Waste
The safe and proper disposal of garbage in order to prevent,
among other things, groundwater contamination, disease, obnoxious odors and dangerous gases, and the presence of vermin inherent in solid waste is first and foremost a matter of public health
and safety. The presence of waste can quickly become a nuisance
or much worse because waste spreads "disease, pestilence, and
death."9 In 1976, the United States Congress enacted the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act 10 (RCRA) in response to the
growing concern with waste management throughout the nation."
In connection with nonhazardous solid waste,' 2 RCRA formally
expressed and authorized what had been known for decades: that
the responsibility for managing such waste should be left to state,
regional and local authorities. 3 The adoption of RCRA was in
part meant to encourage comprehensive state planning in the
solid waste management field.1 4 The regulations promulgated by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to RCRA
9. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 631 (1978).

10. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified in various sections of 42
U.S.C. § 6901-6992k (1988)).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1983).
12. RCRA addresses both hazardous and nonhazardous waste, but much of its
detail is in reference to hazardous waste. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934 (1983)
Municipal solid waste, the focus of most flow control laws, is one type of nonhazardous waste.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1983).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 6946 (1983).
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"contain methods for achieving the objectives of environmentally
sound management and disposal of solid and hazardous wastes, resource conservation and resource recovery, and maximum utilization of valuable resources."' 15 Recycling, a method of resource
conservation recovery, is an example of the type of state solid
waste management plan provision being encouraged by the federal
16
government.
The EPA recognized that when developing programs and
projects under the auspices of a state's solid waste management
plan, a steady and secure supply of waste is of vital importance to
local governmental units. The regulations note that the amount of
waste accumulated in an area of the state engaging in solid waste
management planning "will influence the technology choices for
recovery and disposal, determine economies of scale, and affect
marketability of resources recovered." 7 Thus, the EPA recommends that when devising solutions to solid waste management
problems, including the development of solid waste management
facilities, the amount of waste should be taken into account, as it is
necessary to have a sufficient volume of waste to support the
"goals and objectives of the State plan, including materials or en8
ergy recovery as appropriate."'
In response to the mandates and recommendations contained in
RCRA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and to secure
a steady waste supply, state waste management plans include provisions authorizing local governmental units to designate a specific
facility or site as the only place at which solid waste generated
within the jurisdiction may be processed or disposed. Commonly
known as "flow control" ordinances, these provisions are explicitly
authorized in more than twenty states' 9 and typically provide that
15. 40 C.F.R. § 256.01(a) (1993).
16. 40 C.F.R. §§ 256.30-.31 (1993).

17. 40 C.F.R. § 255.10(c) (1993).
18. Id.
19. Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-20-107); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 22A-220A); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6406 (31)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ch.
403.713); Hawaii (HAw. REV. STAT. § 340A-3(a)); Illinois (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34,
para 5-1047); Indiana (IND. CODE § 36-9-31-3 & 4); Iowa (Iowa Code § 28G.4); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. § 38:2307(9)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1304B(2)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. § 115A.80); Mississippi (Miss. CODE ANN. § 17-17319); Missouri (Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.202); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-22,
48:13A-5); New York (1991 N.Y. LAWS ch. 569, at 1687-89); North Carolina (N.C.
GEN. STAT 130A-294); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE, § 23-29-06(6) & (8)); Ohio
(OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 343.01(H)(2)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 268.317(3) &
(4)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4000.303(c)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-19-10(49)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-211-814); Vermont (VT.
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all waste generated within the particular jurisdiction must be delivered to a site designated by the government for processing or disposal. Local governments2" adopt these laws pursuant to state
constitutional authority 21 or enabling statutes.22 Flow control directives essentially amount to "export bans," normally imposed to
support a local waste management facility. "Import bans," which
could be considered a form of flow control but are not typically
discussed in those terms,23 are restrictions imposed by the state
preventing the disposal of out-of-state waste at in-state facilities,
usually privately owned landfills. 24
The Need for Flow Control in Solid Waste Management
Legislative flow control, in the form of export bans, has been a
vital economic element in supporting dozens of major waste-to-energy and landfill-based waste disposal programs involving billions
of dollars in capital investment.2 5 This relationship between flow
control and the security for such programs stems from the methods
by which local governments discharge their historical and legal duties to provide for the proper collection and disposal of solid

B.

waste.

26

Waste Collection and Disposal Relationships
Waste collection arrangements traditionally have been local in
nature, and their degree of privatization varies widely among communities. Residential waste collection is usually performed by mu-

1.

STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2203a, 2203b); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-28.01); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35.21.120, 36.58.040); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE 240-2STAT. § 159.13(3), (11)).
20. Generally in this Article, "local government" refers to counties, cities, towns,
and villages.

lb); Wisconsin (WIs.
21. See, e.g.,

CAL. CONST.

art. XI §§ 5(a), 7 (1976 & Supp. 1994); N.Y. CONST. art.

IX, § 2(c)(10) (McKinney 1987).
22. See supra n.19.
23. For purposes of this Article, references to "flow control" refer only to export
bans.
24. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 223 S. Ct. 2019, 2022 (1992).
25. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES, FACING AMERICA'S TRASH: WHAT'S NEXT FOR MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE

(1989); N.C. Vasuki, Solid Waste Authorities: Getting Movement on Needed Projects,
SOLID WASTE & POWER,

Aug. 1991, at 20.

26. See generally Matula v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. App. 2d 93 (1957) (finding
that the regulation of solid waste is a duty of the California city, not merely a right);
City of Rochester v. Gutberlett, 105 N.E. 548 (N.Y. 1914) (upholding the right of the
New York municipality to determine how to best provide for the collection of
garbage).
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nicipal collection forces,2 7 or private haulers operating under
municipal contract 28 or municipal franchise.29 Commercial waste,
the most profitable type of waste collected,3 ° is normally hauled by
private companies on a freely competitive basis. 31 As discussed below, it is the ability of local governments to control these haulers
and where they transport the collected waste that often determines
the feasibility of the solid waste processing and disposal programs.
Disposal of waste historically occurred at landfills, either municipally or privately owned.32 Greatly tightened state regulation in
the 1970s and 1980s, however, drove up landfill pricing and
prompted a large number of landfill closures, particularly in the
Northeast and Florida.33 These events indirectly led to a large
scale need for flow control. Expecting the trend to continue, seeking to protect taxpayers, and attempting to carry out traditional
municipal waste disposal responsibilities, a great number of cities
and counties sponsored the development of waste-to-energy facilities.34 These transactions were models of privatization. Private
27. Municipalities which provide solid waste collection services typically do so using municipal employees and municipal vehicles, as is the case for residential waste in
the City of New York. For further discussion, see infra part V.A. When collection
services are provided by municipal forces, flow control has been relatively uncontroversial so far. It is typically the attempt to control private haulers seeking to dispose of waste at the lowest cost available that has resulted in the challenging of flow
control laws.
28. In such a situation, the hauler is typically paid directly by the government for
collection services rendered under the terms of the contract.
29. In franchised solid waste collection programs, the government grants to the
hauler a franchise to collect waste and, typically, the hauler is paid directly by the
ratepayers, or customers, on a regulated basis.
30. Commercial waste collection is usually the most profitable waste for two reasons. Generally, businesses are able to pay higher collection rates than residential
customers and they typically generate more waste to be collected as well. Additionally, commercial waste usually contains a larger amount of recyclable materials,
materials which haulers often separate out and sell for their profit. Even if haulers do
not engage in self-separation of recyclables, they may have deals with processing facilities that desire to receive waste rich in recyclables. Such deals may include a reduction in the tipping fee paid by the hauler in order to encourage the hauler to deliver
its waste to the facility. This can result ina reduction of costs for the hauler, which it
may not have to pass through to its customers.
31. In such a situation, commercial customers are able to negotiate freely with
haulers for mutually agreeable rates and service.
32. Buxbaum & Baumol, Service Arrangements for Conventional Disposal, in
EVALUATING THE ORGANIZATION OF SERVICE DELIVERY: SOLID WASTE COLLEC-

AND DISPOSAL 428 (E.S. Savas and Barbara J. Stevens eds., 1977).
33. See WHOSE WASTE Is IT ANYWAY?, supra note 1, at 4.
34. See generally Kelly Outten, Note, Waste to Energy: Environmental and Local
Government Concerns, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 373 (1985) (discussing the development
TION

of waste to energy facilities in the United States).
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firms like Ogden, Wheelabrator, Foster Wheeler, American RefFuel and Westinghouse designed, permitted, built and operated the
plants. Municipalities sited the facilities and arranged for waste
supply (through legislated flow control) and disposal of the
residual ash from the mass-burn plants. 35 Initially, the private companies acted as the owners of the facilities and borrowed funds to
finance construction. Certain changes made in the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, however, made private ownership and financing less attractive,36 and led to increased public ownership and financing of
waste projects, and an increased reliance on regulatory flow control directives.37
2.

Environmental Concerns

The trend towards public ownership, or at least public sponsorship, of waste facilities also developed from environmental concerns. Municipal responsibility for providing waste collection and
disposal has always been linked to public health and safety. The
enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 38 (CERCLA), however, has heightened the importance of environmental considerations by affecting
municipal finances in connection with environmental concerns.
CERCLA was enacted to "provide for liability, compensation,
cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances released into the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous
waste disposal sites."'39 It generally imposes strict liability on owners and operators of facilities at which hazardous substances have
been disposed.40 One court has described CERCLA's approach as
follows:
CERCLA employs a bifurcated mechanism to promote the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites, hazardous spills, and releases
35. Id. at 381-83 (addressing the use of flow control).
36. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 144(e)(1)(A), Pub. L. No. 99-514,
100 Stat. 2621 (1986), resulted in a reduced amount of qualified private activity bond
funding which may be issued as tax-exempt securities. 26 U.S.C. §§ 141(e)(1)(A),
142(a)(6). Additionally, the changes essentially abolished the investment tax credit
available to companies on equipment in such facilities and reduced the depreciation
benefits on the property and equipment of which private 'owners could take advantage. The two tax elements had provided a substantial cash flow for private owners
under the prior tax laws. For a review of such pre-'86 tax considerations, see Gregory,
et al., supra note 3.
37. See State & Local Govt. Solid Waste Mgmt. § 7.04 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
38. 42 U.S.C. 99 9601-9800 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
39. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1983 & Supp 1994).
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of hazardous substances into the environment. Through the creation of Superfund, the federal government is empowered to respond to hazardous waste disposal. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-05, 961112. The statute also authorizes private parties to institute civil
actions to recover the costs involved in the cleanup of hazardous
wastes from those responsible for their creation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(1-4). 41
Under CERCLA, such private parties may recover "response
costs" for cleanup from a responsible person under § 9607(a).42 A
responsible person includes an owner or operator of such facilities,
an arranger of the transportation for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person and a transporter of such substances who selects the site. Such responsible
persons are liable for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study
carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.43
These costs can result in substantial financial liability for owners,
operators, arrangers and transporters. At first glance, it might appear foolish for municipalities to become owners or operators of
waste disposal sites, thereby subjecting themselves to potential
CERCLA liability. In those situations, however, the municipalities
can control the waste screening processes and attempt to detect
hazardous substances before processing or disposal. Alternatively,
if the waste was delivered to a site not owned by that municipality,
the government would have no control over the screening process
that had been implemented and could not assure itself that the site
had not been inadvertently accepting hazardous substances,
thereby exposing all of its past and future customers to potential
CERCLA liability. It has been held that municipalities that hire
private haulers to collect and dispose of waste can be subject to
41. 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir.

1990).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1983 & Supp. 1994).

43. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1983 & Supp. 1994).
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"arranger" liability, regardless of whether it can be shown that the
municipality's waste actually contained hazardous substances and
regardless of whether the municipality had determined the disposal
site. 44
The threat of such extensive liability in the absence of fault has
provided a great impetus for governments to develop their own
facilities to guard against assuming such risks. Flow control also
provides governments that do not sponsor their own facilities with
the ability to pick and choose which locations are least likely to
become Superfund sites, thus protecting the public and avoiding
substantial financial liability. It should not be forgotten that unlike
private companies, the government's first duty is not to deliver a
profit, but rather to serve the public.
C. Financing Solid Waste Management Facilities
1.

Tipping Fees as Revenues

The cost of these extensive waste facilities, typically tens of millions of dollars, can be financed in a variety of ways. 45 Most financing mechanisms rely on a secure supply of solid waste, and thus,
depend on flow control to assure their feasibility. This is accomplished through the use of the "tipping fee." A tipping fee4 6 is the
per ton charge that haulers delivering waste to a facility must pay
in order to deposit their waste at the site. The amount of the tipping fee is based on the costs associated with the facility or solid
waste management system and the expected tonnage of waste to be
delivered in an operating year. Typically, the costs contributing to
the setting of the tipping fee include, among other things, debt service on any outstanding debt used to finance the facility or the system, operation and maintenance costs of the facility, and, in the
case of a governmental owner, costs of other solid waste management services provided by the government for which it cannot fea44. See Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, 861 F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal. 1992)
("CERCLA does not permit defendants to avoid liability by simply hiring an outside
contractor to perform collection services instead of the city fulfilling that duty itself.")
See also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992) (municipalities

which manage disposal activities held to be "arrangers" under CERCLA).
45. See generally Gregory, et al., supra note 3, at 121-27 (addressing resource recovery financing structures from a financial planner's perspective).
46. Sometimes referred to as a gate fee or disposal charge, the term "tipping fee"
is derived from the fact that trucks delivering waste must "tip" the back-end of the
truck to drop off the waste.
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sibly charge the users directly and which are not self supporting.47
Totalling these and other costs and dividing by the expected tonnage for the operating year thus yields the tipping fee. Any
shortfall in tonnage would therefore result in an inability of the
facility owner to pay a portion of the costs listed above, perhaps
putting its debt at risk of default. Thus, in most cases, there is a
waste supply risk connected with the financing of a waste management facility.48
2.

The Risk of Waste Supply

If the facility is financed by a private owner in either a project
financing 49 or a corporate credit financing, 50 the private owner and
the investors assume the risk of an inadequate waste supply and
typically pass it through to the government via "put-or-pay" contracts entered into with the municipality. Put-or-pay contracts
stem from the operating concept that "trash and cash are fungible,"' and obligate the government to deliver or cause to be delivered to the facility at issue a specified tonnage of waste each year
of the contract. If the government fails to meet its delivery obligations, it is still required under the contract to pay the tipping fee to
the facility for the shortfall in waste. Thus, regardless of whether
the government delivers its waste to the facility, revenues are received by the owners of the facility. In a system financing by a
governmental unit,52 the investors take the risk of waste supply because typically only tipping fee revenues are available to generate
funds sufficient to meet the waste management system's costs, including the payment of debt service. 53 In contrast, general obliga47. For example, recycling education programs or special household hazardous
waste drop-off days do not generate revenues and, their costs must be covered by
tipping fees for services for which the government can charge a fee.
48. See generally WHO'S WASTE IS IT ANYWAY?, supra note 1, at 5 (describing the
waste supply risk in various financing structures).
49. In a private project financing, the private company typically finances the facility with the security of a contract with a specific governmental unit which p!edges to
supply waste to the facility and pay for its processing or disposal.
50. In a corporate credit financing, the private company finances the facility with
its own credit as security. Such privately owned and operated facilities are commonly
referred to as merchant facilities in which owner, to secure its debt, signs Contracts
with several different entities, essentially selling capacity in the facility to these
entities.
51. WHOSE WASTE IS IT ANYWAY?, supra. 1, at 5.
52. In a system financing, the governmental unit typically issues long-term debt to
finance a facility, secured by the revenues of the solid waste system.
53. Another source of funds that may be available with respect to waste-to-energy
facilities is the revenues from the sale of energy produced at such facilities. The
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tion financings54 of governmentally-owned waste facilities protect
investors from the risk of waste supply because facility revenues do
not solely support the bonds. Instead, the government secures the
bonds and therefore assumes the risk of waste supply. Thus, over
the long term, the risk of hauler non-delivery in waste facility
financings resides in the investors, private owners or the level of
government sponsoring the bonds, unless the local government
connected with the project is able to use taxpayer dollars or raise a
solid waste management fee to offset some of the associated costs.
3. Flow Control as Credit Support
With waste delivery shortfalls correlated to debt service
shortfalls, meaning that hauler evasions 55 are a credit risk, investors and credit rating agencies insisted upon, and received, assurances of waste supply. 56 This was accomplished through the
adoption of enabling laws on the state level and implementing ordinances establishing export bans on the local level. In other
words, flow control ordinances became a primary means by which
local governments could support their facilities and secure a steady
revenue stream.
As waste management technologies and mandates began to
evolve, flow control was used to provide credit risk security for
other types of waste management facility financings as well.57 With
increased concerns over the desirability of waste-to-energy plants,
amount of energy produced, however, is dependent in part on the amount of waste
combusted. Thus, the waste supply risk is present here as well.
54. General obligation debt refers to the fact that while revenues from a specific
source of income are not pledged to pay the debt service, the government's general
fund credit secures the bonds. That is, the government is obligated to pay debt service
from its general fund and, if necessary, must raise taxes to generate funds sufficient to
make its debt service payments.
55. Hauler evasions constitute instances in which a hauler was expected, through
laws, contracts or other means, to deliver its collected waste to a designated site, but
failed to do so.
56. For a look at the early concerns of credit rating agencies and their evaluation
criteria in resource recovery financings, see STANDARD & POOR'S CREDITWEEK, Oct.
15, 1984, at 44-54.
57. See, e.g., Economic and InstitutionalBarriersto Private Investment in Resource
Conservation and Recovery, SYMPOSIUM ON RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY: SUBCOMM. ON TRANSPORTATION AND COMMERCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON

INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (addressing economic feasibility of waste disposal facilities and guaranteed waste flows; see also H.R.

REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238,
6246 (listing topics discussed at above symposium).
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there has been a sharp decline in new orders for such facilities. 58 In
recent years, materials recovery facilities (MRFs),5 9 mixed waste
processing facilities 6° and composting facilities 61 have begun to

proliferate across the nation. This is a direct result of increased
federal encouragement of the use of alternatives to landfilling and
incineration 62 along with the adoption of legislation in many states

requiring recycling and the diversion of waste from rapidly decreasing landfill space. 63 California, one of the more progressive
states in this regard, provides in its Integrated Waste Management

Act 64 for the imposition of fines on municipalities that do not meet

the stated diversion goals. 65 Flow control enables local governments to develop the waste facilities needed to assure compliance
with such mandates and statutes. Although materials recovery,
58. See, e.g., Around the States: California,22 SOLID WASTE REPORT 5 (Jan. 28,

1991) (Alameda County voters approve ban on garbage incineration); Franklin, Recycling is Focus of State Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 1990, Metro Region, at 1
(noting that state solid waste plan makes incineration a choice of last resort); Wisconsin Passes MajorRecycling Bill, INTEGRATED WASTE

MANAGEMENT,

May 16, 1990, at

1 (Wisconsin bans incineration of recyclable materials).
59. Most materials recovery facilities (MRFs) typically handle clean, curbside separated residential recyclables, preparing them for marketing to purchasers of recyclable materials.
60. Mixed waste processing facilities process mixed loads of municipal solid waste
and separate out recyclable materials for marketing.
61. Composting facilities process the compostable portion of mixed municipal
solid waste or certain selected types of municipal solid waste.
62. The EPA sought to establish national goals for solid waste management practices. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, THE SOLID WASTE DILEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 1-4 (1989) (hereinafter AGENDA FOR ACTION). The report strongly recommends an integrated waste

management approach of, in order of desirability, source reduction, recycling, combustion and landfilling, to address local solid waste problems. Id. at 16-17. Source
reduction involves asking manufacturers to reduce the amount and toxicity of their

packaging and influencing consumers to change their buying habits with regard to
packaging. Id. at 18. Recycling is meant to divert from landfills and incinerators
materials in the waste stream which can be reused in some form, thereby reducing
both waste volume and the need for new materials. Id. Combustion reduces the
amount of waste to be landfilled, burning the waste so that only the residual ash needs
to be buried. As noted earlier, many combustion facilities generate energy from the
waste. Id. at 19. Generally, the EPA encouraged non-landfill disposal facilities "as the
preferred means of solid waste management whenever technically and economically
feasible." 40 C.F.R. § 256.31(e) (1991).
63. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 115A.02; N.J.S.A. § 13:1E-99.32-99.43; R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 23-19-3(11).
64. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 40000-41000 (1984 & Supp. 1995).
65. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 41813. California requires municipalities to divert
25% of their municipal solid waste by January 1, 1995, and 50% by January 1, 2000.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 41780. Methods of diversion accepted by the State include
source reduction, recycling and composting. Id.
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mixed waste processing and composting facilities are less capital
intensive than waste-to-energy facilities, they nevertheless need a
secure waste stream in order to generate steady revenues sufficient
to justify investment. Flow control also helps governments in the
development of new and expanded landfills, as well as expensive
improvements to old landfills as required by state and federal policies. 66 Thus, an assured waste supply assists all types of waste management facilities in securing financing and meeting governmental
long-term health, safety and environmental goals.
The True Reason for Waste Facilities and Flow Control
The need to plan and provide for waste management on a longterm basis is often forgotten in the flow control debate. The very
reason a government builds or sponsors these facilities, and thus
needs flow control laws, should be considered. Landfill disposal
arrangements are typically short-term, year-to-year relationships,
which are subject to the vagaries of the market. In today's market,
the ability to plan long-term for assured and proper disposal of
waste requires long-term commitments, debt and security. These
factors, however, should not blur the motivations underlying all
those efforts: protecting the public health and safety through effective, reasoned and dependable means. These rationales were given
much greater weight in the past and, to a degree, were accepted by
the courts when haulers began to challenge flow control laws in an
effort to bring waste to their own facilities or other sites with lower
tipping fees.
D.

II. Carters and the Courts: Hauler Challenges to Flow Control
Private haulers have challenged 67 legislative flow control in court
for ninety years, losing consistently until the 1990s. Arguments
66. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 258 (1993); N.J.A.C. 7:26-2 (1994); 25 PA. CODE ch. 273
(1994).

67. Haulers have repeatedly challenged flow control for the simple reason that
often the governmentally designated disposal site charges the haulers a higher tipping
fee than at other sites. This may be on account of the fact that the governmentally
sponsored facility's tipping fees are set at a level, as discussed earlier, sufficient to

meet the full costs of the solid waste management system, including debt service, operation and maintenance costs and the costs of certain other services provided, such
as recycling education and special household hazardous waste disposal days. In addition to the obvious objection that the government needs the revenues, governments

also object to such hauler evasions because the site to which the hauler wishes to
transport its waste is often a landfill. T'pically, private landfills have lower tipping
fees than public processing facilities. One reason for not wanting to send waste to a
landfill is that in many states, state policy requires governments to achieve a certain
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against legislative flow control based on antitrust, property taking
and interstate commerce discrimination were rejected routinely by
the courts at all levels.
A.

Due Process in the Supreme Court

In an ironic twist, considering its later decision in Carbone, the
United States Supreme Court began the long run of unsuccessful
challenges to flow control. In 1905, the Supreme Court upheld the
flow control ordinance at issue in CaliforniaReduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works.68 In that case, San Francisco had granted a
fifty-year exclusive franchise to a single company to dispose, by
"crematories or by a process of reduction,"69 of garbage collected
in the jurisdiction and to charge a per load fee to do so.70 The
ordinance demonstrates the strong public health and safety element associated with flow control provisions. The crematories to
be built pursuant to the disposal franchise were required to combust the waste completely and prevent odors and smells from escaping from the waste, the combustion process or the "residuum."
Waste subject to the flow control franchise included "house refuse,
dirt, ashes, cinders, sludge, crockery, tins, bones and other like
matter, dead animals ... putrid vegetable matter, fish, flesh" and
condemned food. 71 The flow control aspect of the ordinance stated
that all persons in the City were required to deliver their waste to
the crematory once it was constructed, and violations were punishable by fines and imprisonment. Additionally, the franchisee was
authorized to collect a tipping fee from the haulers of up to twenty
cents per load delivered.72
In its decision upholding the ordinance in the face of a due process "takings" challenge asserted by a hauler acting in violation of
the ordinance, the Supreme Court viewed the issue to be a public
health and safety matter, and focused on the City's authority and
73
obligation to protect the public health by all reasonable means.
diversion rate, or percentage of waste that is not landfilled, but is instead recycled,

composted or transformed into energy at a waste-to-energy facility. If haulers instead
landfill this waste, the government runs the risk of not meeting its diversion goals and
of incurring fines from the state.
68. 199 U.S. 306 (1905).
69. Id. at 307.
70. Id. at 308.
71. Id.
72. 199 U.S. at 308.
73. Id. at 318-20.
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In finding that the City's choices must be given due deference in
matters of the public health and safety, the Court stated that:
States possess, because they have never surrendered, the
power-and therefore municipal bodies, under legislative sanction, may exercise the power-to prescribe such regulations as
may be reasonable, necessary and appropriate, for the protection of the public health and comfort .... If a regulation, enacted by competent public authority avowedly for the protection
of the public health, has a real, substantial relation to that object, the courts will not strike
it down on grounds merely of pub74
lic policy or expediency.
The Court also noted that a hauler should not object to a municipal
flow control provision:
Still less has the licensed scavenger a right to complain; for his
right to convey garbage and refuse through the public streets, in
covered wagons, was derived from the public, and he was subject to such regulations as the constituted authorities, in their
exercise of the police power, might adopt."
The Court determined that the flow control ordinance and all it
contemplated constituted a regulation to protect the public health
and safety. The Court reasoned that the municipal authorities may
have thought that the safety of the community could not be assured
unless all the waste that constituted the nuisance and caused the
danger was carried to a crematory where it could be promptly destroyed by fire, thereby minimizing the danger to the public
health.76 Thus, the Court, finding that it could not say that the flow
control ordinance violated the due process clause or resulted in an
unconstitutional taking of private property for public use, upheld
the ordinance.77
The Court's statements in California Reduction regarding the
wide berth given to governments in matters of public health and
safety have served as guiding principles for local governments in
fulfilling their traditional duties and statutory mandates. As a result, municipal preeminence in most matters of waste management
78
was unquestioned.
74. Id. at 318.
75. Id. at 322.
76. Id. at 323.
77. 199 U.S. at 323.
78. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 149 N.E. 2d 869, 873 (N.Y. 1958). City of
Rochester v. Gutberlett, 105 N.E. 548, 550 (N.Y. 1914); Ex parte Zhizuzza, 147 Cal.
328, 332 (1905).
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For instance, California Reduction was immediately applied by
the Supreme Court in Gardner v. Michigan,79 where the Court upheld a flow control ordinance established by the City of Detroit,
finding that "property rights of individuals in the noxious materials
...must be subordinated to the general good."'8 The Court noted
that if the owner of the garbage suffers any loss by its destruction,
"the inconvenience or loss is presumed to be compensated in the
common benefit secured by regulation."' 81 Following the reasoning
developed in CaliforniaReduction, the Court found that the ordinances in question could not "be held
wanting in the due process of
'82
law required by the Constitution.
B. Antitrust Challenges to Flow Control
In addition to raising due process claims, haulers have also traditionally relied on antitrust claims to contest flow control laws, especially in the early and mid-1980s. In general, haulers have argued
that by requiring private hauler waste 83 to be transported to a governmentally-designated site, local governments were acting as monopolists in restraint of trade and violating federal antitrust laws.
The federal courts, however, repeatedly upheld municipal flow
control laws against antitrust challenges pursuant to the "state action" exemption. Under the Sherman Antitrust Act,84 states are
exempt from antitrust liability. 85 This exemption has been ex79. 199 U.S. 325 (1905).
80. Id. at 332-333.

81. Id. at 331 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 333.
83. Note that haulers in flow control cases impliedly consider waste they collect
and haul to be owned by them, at least in relation to determining where such waste
will be transported. Some governments using private haulers have attempted to combat such claims by providing in contracts, franchises or ordinances that collected
waste remains the property of the local government. See Waste Recycling, Inc. v.
Southeast Alabama Solid Waste Disposal Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993)

(where the district court rejected such an attempt at achieving flow control).
Although these claims by haulers are debatable, such a contention is of strongest
force in situations in which the hauler pays waste generators to collect their waste.
For example, in California, haulers, seeking a profit through the marketing of recoverable materials, sometimes pay residential and commercial customers for their recycl-

ables. The California Supreme Court held, prior to the Carbone decision, that in such
situations, a municipality's exclusive franchise to another hauler does not cover such

recyclables, as they have not been "discarded" and continue to have value. See Waste
Management of the Desert, Inc. v. Palm Springs Recycling Center, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 478
(1994) (commonly known as the "Rancho Mirage case").
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1-41 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
85. The state action exemption was articulated by the Supreme Court in Parker v.

Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), and is based on the concept of dual sovereignty.
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tended through case law to municipalities,8 6 which qualify if their
actions are taken pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy that
is affirmatively expressed. A state policy expression will be found
to be affirmatively expressed "if suppression of competition is the
foreseeable result of what the statute authorizes."' This standard
was employed by federal circuit courts in the mid-1980s to uphold
flow control provisions in Ohio8 8 and Iowa,8 9 despite their adverse
impact on free trade. Following these cases, state solid waste statutes have typically included provisions articulating the state's intention to displace competition in the field and thus pass the
antitrust test.9°
Commerce Clause Challenges Before Carbone
As other arguments have proven unsuccessful, in the past twenty
years, haulers have increasingly turned to the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution as a means by which to challenge flow control
laws. In 1978, it was established by the Supreme Court in Philadelphia v. New Jersey9' that solid waste constituted an article of commerce and thus, its transport is subject to Commerce Clause
analysis. Although Philadelphia was an import ban case, 92 the
Court's determination therein has been continually reaffirmed,
most recently in Fort GratiotSanitary Landfill v. Michigan Department of NaturalResources93 and Carbone.94
Typically, haulers contend that state-authorized solid waste export restrictions imposed by local governments interfere with the
free flow of interstate commerce by limiting where haulers can
transport solid waste. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have the power.., to regulate Commerce... among the
several States. ' 95 That provision has historically been read "not
C.

86. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365
(1991); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power and Light, 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
87. City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 373.
88. Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F. 2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985).
89. Central Iowa Refuse Systems v. Des Moines Metro. Solid Waste Agency, 715
F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983).
90. See, e.g., 1991 N.Y. LAWS ch. 569, § 1 (authorizing Rockland County and all
municipalities therein to impose "appropriate and reasonable limitations on competition" with respect to solid waste services).
91. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
92. See supra notes 23 and 24.
93. 112 S. Ct. 2021 (1992).
94. 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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only as an authorization for congressional action, but also, even in
the absence of a conflicting federal statute, as a restriction on permissible state regulation."96 Commonly known as the dormant
Commerce Clause, this "negative" aspect prohibits states, in the
absence of Congressional authorization, from "advancing their
own commercial interests by curtailing the movement of articles of
commerce, either into or out of the state." 97 Nonetheless, the
Court has observed that:
[t]he Commerce Clause does not.., invalidate all state restrictions on commerce. It has long been recognized that, "in the
absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of
local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it." 8
To determine whether a governmental regulation violates the
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has developed a multi-part
test that must be applied to a Commerce Clause challenge. How
this test is applied and interpreted often determines whether a regulation passes muster under the Commerce Clause. Essentially,
the test is as follows:
(1) Is the regulation at issue an evenhanded regulation with
only an incidental effect on interstate commerce, or is it discriminatory against interstate commerce?
(2) If the regulation is evenhanded and effectuates a legitimate
local purpose, it should be upheld unless it is shown that the
burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits.
(3) If the regulation at issue is discriminatory, the government
must show, under a strict scrutiny test, that the law (a)
serves a legitimate local purpose, and (b) the purpose could
not be served by less discriminatory alternative means, or
else the regulation will be struck down.99
D.

Early Governmental Successes

The second part of the test was developed by the Supreme Court
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. °° The Pike test was generally ap96. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
97. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
98. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981) (quoting
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945)).
99. See infra part III.e.
100. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

19951

MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE CONTROL

379

plied in cases upholding export bans in the 1980s. Federal courts in
New Jersey, Ohio and Delaware in the mid-to-late 1980s each
found flow control schemes to have only an incidental effect on
interstate commerce. In New Jersey, 10 1 the contested regulation in
J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection'0 2 required all waste in Hunterdon County, regardless of point of origination, to be delivered to the County's
transfer station, from which the County arranged for disposal.0 3
The Third Circuit ruled that the regulation operated on an evenhanded basis because both in-state and out-of-state haulers were
covered.1°4 Therefore, the regulation, which was crafted to assist in
alleviating the garbage problem, placed the burden on New Jersey
residents,0 5 who may not have the advantage of lower tipping fees
at other sites.' °6
The Ohio case, Hybud Equipment Corporation v. City of Akron,1 0 7 similarly resulted in the denial of a Commerce Clause challenge to a flow-control ordinance. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit ruled that "the economic costs of the [flow control] measure fall hardest on people who generate and collect garbage in the City of Akron."' 0 8 Any increased costs due to the
regulation were passed through to the hauler's customers, i.e., the
residents of the municipality whose duly elected officials instituted
the ordinance in the first place." °9
In Delaware, the district court, in Harvey & Harvey v. Delaware
Solid Waste Authority,"0 upheld a state statute requiring delivery
of solid waste to in-state facilities as part of a legislative program
supporting the Delaware Solid Waste Management Authority's integrated system of waste processing facilities and landfills. The
court found that the law regulated on an evenhanded basis, with
only an incidental effect on interstate commerce, because all waste
in Delaware, regardless of origin, was required to be delivered to
the Authority's facilities.
101. New Jersey has a comprehensive statewide solid waste regulatory program.
102. 857 F.2d 913 (3rd Cir. 1988).

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 916.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 921.
654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 455 U.S. 931, re-

manded, 701 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1982), appealaff'd, 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985).

108. Id. at 1194-95.
109. Id.
110. 600 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del., 1985).
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E. Recent Hauler Victories
In the early 1990s, however, the courts' view of export bans began to change as the trend shifted towards applying the third part
of the Commerce Clause test,"' the strict scrutiny analysis. A district court in Rhode Island, in DeVito Trucking v. Rhode Island
Solid Waste Management Corp.,112 granted a preliminary injunction
against the enforcement of a state regulation requiring all solid
waste to be disposed of at state-licensed facilities. The court found
that the regulation completely eliminated interstate commerce, in
effect conferring an economic benefit on the state authority at the
expense of those engaged in interstate commerce. 113 One contributing factor was that private haulers were charged higher tipping
fees than municipal haulers, essentially acting as subsidizers of the
government." 4 The court concluded that the state's purpose of
public health and safety protection could be achieved in a less discriminatory manner through waste inspections, and its purpose to
provide for a financially
viable disposal system could be achieved
5
by local taxation."1
A 1992 Minnesota case, Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin," 6 upheld an Iowa landfill owner's challenge to a Minnesota
county's flow control law. Because two-thirds of the county's
waste had been privately hauled to the Iowa landfill before the
adoption of the law, the court found clear and substantial discrimination against interstate commerce."17 Although the financial viability of the county's waste facility was found to be a legitimate
local purpose, the court ruled that less discriminatory means of
achieving it were available, including taxation to lower the tipping
8
fee to attract private haulers economically."
In North Carolina, a federal district court, in ContainerCorporation of Carolina v. Mecklenberg County,119 issued a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of a county export ban law. The
law, which was challenged by a local hauling company that transported waste to a landfill it owned in South Carolina, was enacted
in part to support a county-wide integrated recycling, incineration
111.
112.
113.
114.

See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
770 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I. 1991), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991).
Id. at 783.
Id. at 781.

115. Id. at 785.
116. 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993).

117. Id. at 1383, 1387.
118. Id. at 1388.
119. No. 92cv-154-MU (W.D.N.C. June 19, 1992).

1995]

MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE CONTROL

381

and landfill disposal system.120 Surprisingly, the court concluded
that there is no difference between export bans and import bans
and that, as enforced, the law was discriminatory in effect because
it banned the exportation of in-county waste across state borders.121 Conditioning hauler licenses on compliance with the flow
control regulation was determined to be an unlawful attempt to
cause a waiver of the right to engage in interstate commerce. 122
The court noted that less discriminatory means to support the
county's facility were available, including taxation, and stated that
the county had failed to show that the flow control ordinance was
the only effective means available."2
In 1993, an Alabama federal district court, in Waste Recycling,
Inc. v. Southeast Alabama Solid Waste Disposal Authority, 2 4 upheld a challenge to export bans imposed by three Alabama cities.
Each city had adopted an ordinance pursuant to user contracts
signed with a regional solid waste authority requiring all waste generated within the city to be disposed of at the facility that would be
built by the Authority.' 25 One ordinance also vested in the city
title to all waste generated within the city.

26

Another ordinance

permitted haulers to transport the waste out-of-state, but only
upon compliance with strict reporting requirements not applicable

to waste disposed of at the Authority's facility. 27 The court ruled
that the ordinances clearly discriminated against interstate commerce. Moreover, the market-participant doctrine, 28 put forth as a
defense, was found to be inapplicable, as the cities were not pur120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.

123. Id. at 21-22.
124. 814 F. Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993).

125. Id. at 1570.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. The market participant doctrine, as developed by the Supreme Court, provides
that when a governmental entity enters a marketplace as a participant, it is treated as
a proprietor for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis. In other words, when analyzing the constitutionality of the government's actions, the Commerce Clause will not
be implicated unless the government is acting as a market regulator.
This doctrine has been spelled out by the Supreme Court in four major cases. See
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (approving requirement that construction company use 50 percent city residents on public construction projects paid for by the city); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429
(1980) (upholding state's right to limit sales of cement from a state-owned cement
factory to in-state buyers); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)
(upholding state subsidy program to encourage the recycling of abandoned cars, with
tougher restrictions on out-of-state firms). But see South-Central Timber Develop-
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chasers or sellers of the waste, nor were they bona-fide interest
holders as required by the doctrine. 29 The court ruled that the
cities had failed to demonstrate that their method was the least
restrictive alternative and rejected most of the traditional arguments in favor of upholding flow control provisions.1 30 Several alternatives to ensure the economic viability of the facility were
suggested by the court, including charging competitive rates at the
facility and financing the facility through bank loans, ad valorem
taxes, private investors or utility bill assessments. 3 1
F. The New York Approach
The trend towards intolerance of flow control laws created a
conflict between the circuits. Interestingly, the New York courts
had largely rejected the line of analysis being developed in the fedment, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (invalidating state requirement that all
timber bought from state be processed in-state prior to shipment out-of-state).
The market participant doctrine has essentially made review of government action
a two-part process. The initial step, is to determine if the government's actions are
taken as a market regulator or as a market participant. If the latter is the case, then
the Commerce Clause is not implicated and a Commerce Clause analysis need not be
performed. As the Court stated in White, "[tihe impact of the local business preference on out-of-state residents figures into the analysis only after it is decided that the
City is regulating the market rather than participating in it." White, 460 U.S. at 210.
An example of how this would apply in the solid waste disposal arena is if a municipality owned its own facility. Supreme Court Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, implied that in such a
situation the market participant doctrine would apply and, if the government attempted to restrict access to its facility, such actions would not be subject to judicial
review. Id. at 2018. After striking down an attempt to limit the amount of hazardous
waste disposed of in Alabama via a surcharge on out-of-state waste, the Court suggested several alternatives for how the government's goal of banning out-of-state hazardous waste could be achieved. One alternative suggested by Rehnquist in his dissent
was as follows: "Or Alabama may, under the market participant doctrine, open its
own facility catering only to Alabama customers." Id. (citations omitted).
To the extent that a government wishes to prevent waste from being processed
outside its jurisdiction, however, the courts will probably find the market participant
doctrine inapplicable, as in Waste Recycling. Such an attempt at flow control of waste
recyclables is more of a regulatory action, than a proprietary one. This is because,
although the government is considered a participant in the disposal field by virtue of
its ownership of the facility, it is seen as such only regarding actions with respect to
the facility itself. An attempt to restrict the flow of waste under the guise of the
government's ownership of the facility is considered to be an impermissible downstream restriction of interstate commerce. The market participant doctrine is not considered to extend to such regulatory actions, otherwise a local government could
regulate a broad market merely by opening a business in one particular aspect
thereof. See, e.g., South-Central Timber Development, Inc., supra.
129. 814 F. Supp. at 1572.
130. Id. at 1581.
131. Id.
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eral system 132 and, in deciding Town of Clarkstown v. C & A Carbone, Inc.,1 the New York Appellate Division found the Town's
flow control law constitutional. After the New York Court of Appeals denied a motion to hear the case on appeal, Carbone filed a
writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which was granted
in May, 1993. As a result, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown and its potential outcomes became the focus of much of the
waste world. It was clear that the Supreme Court's decision in this
case could determine the future of many existing and planned solid
waste management programs, as well as the future of many businesses engaged in solid waste practices.
IV. The Supreme Court Weighs In: The Carbone Decision
In its May 16, 1994, decision, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down Clarkstown Local Law No. 9,134 a law requiring all nonhazardous solid waste within the Town, whether generated within
Clarkstown or generated outside the Town and brought within its
limits, to be deposited at a Town-designated transfer station. 35
Clarkstown was contractually obligated to deliver and pay for the
136
processing of 120,000 tons of solid waste per year at that facility.
The transfer station was owned and operated by a private company, but the Town could purchase the facility for $1 at the end of a
1 37
-five-year term.
*The Clarkstown ordinance was challenged! by, among others, C
& A Carbone, Inc., a company engaged in the processing of solid
waste. Carbone operated a recycling center in Clarkstown. Under
the provisions of the ordinance, after Carbone removed the recoverable recyclables from the solid waste it received at the recycling
center, it was required to send the residual waste to the designated
transfer station and pay the tipping fee at that facility. 138 Carbone,
which received some waste from out of state, was instead trans132. See, e.g., Town of North Hempstead v. Inc. Village of Westbury, 588 N.Y.S.2d

293 (2d Dep't. 1992); Vinnie Montes Waste Sys. Inc. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 567
N.Y.S.2d 335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); Omni Group Farms, Inc. v. County of Cayuga, 766

F. Supp. 69 (N.D.N.Y. 1991); County of Washington v. Casella Waste Management,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16941 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).

133. 587 N.Y.S.2d 681 (2d Dep't. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2911 (1993).
134. 114 S. Ci. 1677 (1994).

135. Id. at 1680.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1681.
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porting its residual waste to cheaper disposal sites located out of
state.
A.

The Majority Opinion

The relatively brief majority opinion in the 6-3 decision was written by Justice Kennedy and signed by four other Justices. The
Court essentially treated the issue as a standard Commerce Clause
case and began its analysis by noting that, despite the Town's arguments to the contrary, the flow
control ordinance does indeed reg139
ulate interstate commerce.
The Court stated that, although on its face Local Law No. 9 may
not appear to regulate interstate commerce because it treats all
waste equally regardless of where it originates, the economic effects of the law reach outside New York State in two ways. First,
by requiring Carbone to send the nonrecyclable portion of out-ofstate waste to the designated transfer station, and thus causing Carbone to pass the tipping fee at the transfer station through to the
waste generators,'140 the ordinance drives up the cost for out-ofstate waste generators to dispose of their solid waste. Second, because the ordinance prevents everyone except the designated
transfer station from processing the in-town waste and the residual
waste from Carbone's facility, out-of-state businesses are denied
access to a local market. 41 Thus, the Court concluded that this
brings the ordinance within the scope of the Commerce Clause.
In determining the validity of Local Law No. 9, the Court applied the standard Commerce Clause test.1 42 The Court ruled that
the law discriminates against interstate commerce and thus, found
no need to apply the Pike test.' 43 Since the law favors an in-town
processor of solid waste over out-of-state processors, the Court
held the ordinance to be a discriminatory market regulation similar
in effect to other local processing laws struck down in earlier Com44
merce Clause cases.
In perhaps a novel concept, the Court considered the article of
commerce at issue not to be the solid waste itself, but rather the
service of processing and disposing of it. The law effectively bars
the import of out-of-state processing services and in fact, according
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

114 S. Ct. at 1681.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 91-99.
Id. at 1682. See also supra note 100.

144. 114 S. Ct. at 1682.
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to the Court, "squelches" all competition in the waste processing
field, whether in-state or out-of-state. 145 This denial of access to
the local market is discrimination against interstate commerce, and
the Court stated that, "absent the clearest showing that the unobstructed flow of interstate commerce itself is unable to solve the
local problem" for which the law was adopted, the law must be
declared invalid. 46
The Court found several nondiscriminatory alternatives to address the alleged justification for the ordinance, namely health and
environmental problems, as well as uniform safety regulations. 47
Also, the Court disposed of the Town's argument that the longterm survival of the transfer station necessitated special financing
by proposing alternatives to the law, including subsidizing the facility through general taxes or municipal bonds. The Court observed
that, "having elected to use the open market to earn revenues for
its project, the [T]own may not employ discriminatory regulation
to give that project an advantage over rival businesses from out of
State.' 48 Thus, the Court held that Local Law No. 9 impermissibly
regulates interstate commerce.
B.

The Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, disagreeing with
the majority finding that the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce. Justice O'Connor noted that the laws involved in
the Commerce Clause cases cited by the majority all discriminated
on the basis of geographic origin. 149 In other words, they "gave a
competitive advantage to local business as a group vis-a-vis their
out-of-state or non-local competitors as a group."' 50 Local Law
No. 9, however, does not give more favorable treatment to local
interests as a group as compared to non-local economic interests.
Justice O'Connor observed that, "[r]ather, the garbage sorting monopoly is achieved at the expense of all competitors, be they local
or nonlocal.''115 Justice O'Connor noted that this distinction is best
demonstrated by the fact that the challenging party, Carbone, is
located within the Town.' 52 Thus, in-Town and out-of-Town
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 1683.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1684.
114 S. Ct. at 1688.
Id.
Id. at 1689.
Id.
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processors are treated equally under the ordinance and Justice
O'Connor considered the law to "discriminate" evenhandedly. She
therefore concluded that, because in-Town competitors are just as
equally burdened by the ordinance, Local Law No. 9 does not discriminate against interstate commerce.
Justice O'Connor then applied the Pike test 153 to determine
whether the law imposes an excessive burden on interstate commerce as compared to the local benefits conferred. She acknowledged the importance of the local interest in proper disposal of
waste but noted that this interest could also be accomplished by a
law merely requiring proper processing somewhere. 54 She also
noted that the Town's purpose of ensuring the financial viability of
the transfer station could be achieved by means with a less drastic
impact on the flow of goods-by imposing taxes, issuing municipal
55
bonds or by lowering the tipping fee to a competitive level.'
In concluding that the burden of the ordinance is excessive, Justice O'Connor noted that, given the number of jurisdictions in
which flow control ordinances could be adopted, there is a high
potential for conflict.' 56 In other words, a processor like Carbone,
once it sorts out the recyclables, may be faced with complying with
two flow control laws (one from Clarkstown and one from the jurisdiction where the waste originated) that require the disposal of
the residual waste at two different sites. Justice O'Connor conthe eliminacluded that situations such as'this:are likely to lead to 57
tion of the movement of waste between jurisdictions.
Justice O'Connor also' addressed the argument that RCRA authorizes the implementation of flow control and thus supersedes
the dormant Commerce Clause. Although Justice O'Connor stated
that certain provisions in RCRA do appear to indicate that Congress expected local governments to implement some form of flow
control, she concluded that such provisions do not "rise to the level
of the 'explicit' authorization required by our dormant Commerce
Clause decisions."' 58
Justice O'Connor concluded her opinion with an important notation. She said, "It is within Congress' power to authorize local imposition of flow control. Should Congress revisit this area, and
153. See supra note 100.

154. 114 S. Ct. at 1690.
155. Id.

156. Id.
157. Id. at 1691.
158. Id. at 1692.
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enact legislation providing a clear indication that it intends States
and localities to implement flow control, we will, of course, defer to
that legislative judgment. ' 159 Thus, municipalities that wish to implement legal flow control can turn, and as will be seen later in this
Article, have turned, to Congress for authorization to do so.
C.

The Dissenting Opinion

In a lengthy dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Blackmun, Justice Souter made several important
points. He noted that in applying the dormant Commerce Clause
test to Local Law No. 9, the majority ignored the key difference
between such local processing cases and this one: "the exclusion
worked by Clarkstown's Local Law 9 bestows no benefit on a class
in
of local private actors, but instead directly aids the government
160
satisfying a traditional governmental responsibility.'
Because the law differentiates merely between "the one entity
responsible for ensuring the job gets done and all other enterprises,
regardless of their location," Justice Souter found that the law
"falls outside that class of tariff or protectionist measures that the
Commerce Clause has traditionally been thought to bar States
"',6 Justice Souter thus stated
from enacting against each other ....
the Clause's dormant
extending
that the majority is "greatly
62
reach."1 He noted several arguments against such extension, including the lack of any indication that an out-of-state processor
had been harmed by the law or that the interstate movement of
trash was affected "one whit." Justice Souter also noted that the
effect of the law was to spread the financing costs among the local
out-of-state economic interests, which
generators of trash, not the
1 63
result.'
"equitable
an
was
Justice Souter acknowledged the similarity between Local Law
No. 9 and the Court's earlier processing cases but noted that the
differences are significant enough to prevent the case from being
decided the same way. Because the law favors only a single processor who is essentially an agent of the municipal government, any
discrimination caused by the ordinance "fails to produce the sort of
entrepreneurial favoritism we have previously defined and con159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

114 S. Ct. at 1691.
Id.
Id.
Id.
114 S. Ct. at 1693.
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demned as protectionist."' 164 Justice Souter noted that Clarkstown
investors who wished to provide processing services faced the same
exclusion as out-of-town processors. As such, "Local Law 9's exclusion of outside capital was part of a broader exclusion of private
capital," and does not discriminate against out-of-state investors.
Therefore, any protectionist effect was substantially mitigated. 165
Justice Souter also emphasized the fact that the transfer station
was essentially a municipal facility because it was built and operated under a contract with the Town and it would soon become
municipally owned. The facility performed a function traditionally
and statutorily in the domain of local governments. As he stated,
"favoring state-sponsored facilities differs from discriminating
among private economic actors, and is much less likely to be protectionist."' 166 Justice Souter then concluded that these differences
from earlier dormant Commerce Clause cases justify applying the
Pike test because "a more particularized enquiry is necessary
before a court can say whether such a law does in fact smack too
strongly of economic protectionism." 67
In determining whether the burden on interstate commerce was
excessive in comparison to the local benefits, Justice Souter observed that the monopolistic nature of the ordinance was "not itself
suspicious for purposes of the Commerce Clause." This is because
challenges to monopolies arise under antitrust statutes, not the
Constitution. He noted that, "[tihe only right to compete that [the
Commerce Clause] protects is the right to compete on terms independent of one's location." 68
As noted earlier, Justice Souter concluded that there is no "geographically based selection among firms, and it is clear from the
face of the ordinance that nothing hinges on the source of trash
that enters Clarkstown or upon the destination of the processed
waste that leaves the transfer station.' 69 Also, although there is
an incidental local economic benefit in the form of local jobs, it is
mitigated by the fact that Clarkstown finances these benefits "from
the resources of the very citizens who passed it into law." Thus,
every resident bears a portion of the burden imposed by the law,
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 1695.
Id.
Id. at 1698.
114 S. Ct. at 1698.
Id. at 1699.
Id.
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"an uncharacteristic feature of statutes claimed to violate the Com170
merce Clause.'
Justice Souter examined the rationale behind the ordinance and
the favored facility and pointed to Clarkstown's need to provide
trash processing at an affordable price now and in the future, regardless of whether the private market sees fit to meet that need.
Additionally, "there is no question that a 'put or pay' contract...
will be a significant inducement" to private companies to build a
facility for the benefit of municipalities. 171 He also noted that there
are limits to a municipality's ability to raise taxes and issue bonds
to finance the facility. 172 Flow control has an advantage over taxes
and bonds in that it equitably spreads the cost of the facility among
all residents who generate trash, the true users of the facility.
Justice Souter concluded that, because the municipality's interests were substantial, the alternative means for advancing them
were less desirable. Moreover, since no harm had been shown to
anyone other than residents of the Town who paid higher fees for
disposal services, the ordinance should not be struck down as violative of the Commerce Clause. 73
D.

The Effect of the Carbone Decision

1. Direct Impact on Solid Waste Facilities
The language used by the majority was exceptionally, and perhaps unexpectedly, broad, indicating an intent to forestall further
contest over the issue. In an ironic twist for privatization enthusiasts, private haulers have succeeded in placing in jeopardy the interests of painstakingly privatized waste disposal systems, because
if municipalities cannot control where their waste is disposed, they
will be unable to support the often-privatized facilities with which
they have put-or-pay contracts or construction and operation
agreements.
The bond rating agencies thus far have been cautious in down1 74
grading waste disposal facility debt in response to Carbone.
Longstanding rating criteria have included legislated flow control
170. Id.
171. 114 S. Ct. at 1701.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1702.

174. See Slants & Trends, 25 SOLID WASTE REPORT 365 (Nov. 17, 1994); Slants &
Trends, 25 SOLID WASTE REPORT 127 (Apr. 21, 1994) (each discussing views of rating
agencies that while some ratings may be weakened, rating agencies expect many facilities to find the means to stay afloat).

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XXII

as one of several relevant rating factors. 175 Also of importance are
the cost and availability of the alternative, competing disposal facilities, which are available on a practical basis to private haulers
seeking to escape legal flow control. The ability of the municipality
to price its disposal service to attract haulers economically varies
considerably in different locations, which makes it difficult to formulate generalizations about disposal system creditworthiness after Carbone.
Nevertheless, two facilities in Ohio have already shut down, in
part because of concerns about waste supply in the absence of legislative flow control. City-owned waste incinerators in Columbus
and Akron, which were financed through the issuance of long-term
municipal bonds, were closed in November, 1994, with officials cit176
ing the lack of flow control as a major reason.
In the immediate future, the Carbone case can be expected to
have a dampening effect on the development of new municipal
waste disposal facilities. For example, local governments are unlikely to sponsor the compost and recycling facilities mandated by
law and policy, or undertake landfill system expansions, until they
are confident about the levels of waste that they can lawfully cause
to be delivered to the new facility. One unfortunate result may be
the shrinkage, delay or cancellation of a considerable number of
valuable currently planned public-private disposal ventures.
2.

Broad Judicial Interpretations

The effect of the Court's broad language in Carbone is already
being seen in courts nationwide. 77 Several decisions have been issued in various jurisdictions that demonstrate the wide swath cut
175. See STANDARD & POOR'S

CREDITWEEK, Oct.

15, 1984, at 44-54.

176. Karen Pierog, Two Ohio Waste Incinerators Close, Partly Due to May High
Court Ruling, BOND BUYER, Nov. 9, 1994, at 1, 9.
177. See Southcentral Pennsylvania Waste Haulers Association v. Bedford-FultonHuntingdon Solid Waste Authority, No. 1:CV-93-1318 (M.D. Penn. June 24, 1994)
(the district court found that the flow control component of the state solid waste management plan was discriminatory, but ruled that there are issues of fact that must be
decided to determine whether there were any other means available to advance the
legitimate local interest, because the defendants had detailed their unsuccessful efforts to find a less discriminatory means of obtaining long-term waste disposal capacity as well as the factors involved which they claimed forced them to choose to utilize
a flow control scheme); Waste Disposal, Inc. v. Town of Barnstable, No. 91-13231DPW (D. Mass. May 31, 1994) (the district court engaged in an extensive examination
of the solid waste management plan at issue and the facts supporting its development
but ultimately used Carboneto put aside most of the offered justifications, including
the Town's desire to maintain a self-sustaining solid waste management system to
meet state and federal goals).
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by Carbone. Courts are generally construing the decision broadly,
perhaps even more broadly than the Court anticipated; some decisions clearly amount to overly enthusiastic applications of Carbone.
For example, in Mid-American Waste Systems, Inc. v. Fisher,178 the
Ohio district court used Carbone to justify the granting of a temporary restraining order against the enforcement of two resolutions of
the Solid Waste Authority of Central Ohio (SWACO). 79 One resolution acted as a flow control regulation, and the other imposed a
per ton solid waste generation fee on all solid waste generated
within SWACO's district. SWACO planned to use the generation
fee to reduce the tipping fee at its facilities to $0.00, thereby economically encouraging local haulers to bring waste to the facilities;
such a practice is commonly known as "economic flow control."' 8 °
The Mid-American court focused on the Carbone argument that
the purpose of the Clarkstown ordinance in that case was to finance the private transfer station, and analogized from there, effectively ignoring the Supreme Court's suggestion that the Clarkstown
facility could alternatively have been supported through general
taxes or municipal bonds. The Mid-American court noted the suggestion, but did not analyze whether the generation fee concept
was different. Instead, the District Court essentially stretched the
concept of discrimination "in practical effect" too far. The court
focused on the "economic effect" of the waste generation fee resolution in the broadest sense possible, finding that to enforce the
generation fee resolution would eliminate competition by other facilities wishing to receive in-district waste. Thus, the court found
that the resolution discriminated against interstate commerce.' 8 '
This sort of extension of Commerce Clause doctrine reaches too
far down the stream of commerce. To claim that the resolution
discriminates against, and not just incidentally affects, interstate
commerce solely because one possible result is the elimination of
competition is extreme. If this line of reasoning is followed, a resolution applying general taxes or the proceeds of the sale of municipal bonds to lower the tipping fee at a facility might also be
considered to discriminate against interstate commerce, conflicting
with the alternatives suggested by the Carbone Court.
The breadth of the Carbone decision is also shown in Tri-County
Industries, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Re178. No.. C-2-94-493 (S.D. Ohio May 31, 1994).

.179. Id.
180. See infra notes 227-236.

181. No. C-2-94-493 (S.D. Ohio May 31, 1994).
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sources,182 where the court, confronted with a challenge by a hauler
seeking to transport waste to an unauthorized site, invalidated a
flow control ordinance in a Pennsylvania county solid waste management plan. The court found that the ordinance in question discriminated in practical effect against interstate commerce. 3 The
law provided that waste in the county could be disposed only at a
designated facility, 84 but at the time, the only facility designated
was located within Pennsylvania. The court thus shifted the burden
to the defendants to demonstrate that no nondiscriminatory alternatives were available to achieve the admittedly legitimate local
purpose of proper solid waste management and compliance with
state law.' 5 Defendants maintained that the risk of escalating disposal costs in part motivated the county to designate a single disposal site and that the site was selected through an open, fair and
competitive interstate process.' 86 Nonetheless, the court held that
the process used to choose a disposal site is irrelevant; rather, the
use of single site was the issue. 87
The court noted that even if the county had designated two sites,
one in-state and one out-of-state, there may still have been a legitimate Commerce Clause claim under a Pike analysis.18 8 The court,
however, did not address how such a designation would put a burden on interstate commerce, let alone a burden in excess of the
local benefits. This omission might be read to imply that any
processing and disposal program that is not completely open to
competition could be considered a violation of the Commerce
Clause. Such reasoning could cause a drastic change in solid waste
planning by local governments. 8 9
3. Reinvigorating Antitrust Challenges
Broad interpretations of Carbone may also be used to reinvigorate antitrust challenges to flow control practices."9 In a decision
with poor implications for governments attempting to develop
their own solid waste management systems, the federal district
182. No. 93-592 (W.D. Penn. Oct. 12, 1994).
183. Id.

184. Id.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
No. 93-592 (W.D. Penn. Oct. 12, 1994).
Id.
Id.
See supra note 177.
See supra part IV.

1995]

MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE CONTROL

court in Pine Ridge Recycling, Inc. v. Butts County,191 did not dis-

miss plaintiff's antitrust claim that the County had attempted to
monopolize the solid waste disposal market in its region in restraint of trade. The County maintained that it fit within the state
action exemption because it was acting under state authorization. 192 Rather than follow the long history of solid waste antitrust
decisions, the court instead found the state action exemption not to
apply, because interpreting the state authorization as sought by the
County would result in a view in direct conflict with the Commerce
Clause. 9 3

This cross-pollination of legal concepts is dangerous. The court
cited no authority for using one legal concept to give rise to another. Moreover, the court did not offer an explanation as to why
actions that may be in violation of the Commerce Clause may not
be excused with respect to any antitrust claims raised. The true
danger of the Pine Ridge Recycling court's approach is that it could
abolish the longstanding state action exemption through the use of
the Commerce Clause in many areas affecting municipal governance. As noted earlier, local governments have for years developed solid waste management plans and programs in reliance on
authority granted by state statute or constitutional provision. A
reemergence of antitrust claims could potentially cause a great upheaval in solid waste management areas, perhaps detrimentally interfering with the public health and safety, and certainly affecting
municipal finances through exposure to potential antitrust
damages. 94
4.

Recent Developments

Although Carbone has predominantly resulted in flow control
provisions being invalidated, this is not exclusively the case. On
December 20, 1994, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania upheld a preliminary injunction preventing haulers from violating a
County flow control ordinance. The case, Delaware County v. Ray191. 855 F. Supp 1264 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
192. Id. at 1271.
193. Id.
194. The reason a reproliferation of antitrust claims is of concern to municipalities
is the relief associated with such claims-treble damages. See 15 U.S.C.A. (West 1973
& Supp. 1994). Typically, the Commerce Clause does not provide an avenue for parties to bring suit for damages. Most Commerce Clause suits seek relief in equity
rather than at law. Thus, to say a municipality, through its flow control law, acts in
restraint of trade in violation of the Commerce Clause is one thing; to say it acts in
restraint of trade in violation of antitrust laws is quite another.
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mond T. Opdenaker & Sons, Inc.,19 involved a challenge to the
County's flow control ordinance that required all waste generated
in the County to be delivered to facilities designated by the
County. Although out-of-state facilities were eligible for designation, none had been designated at the time. The haulers sought to
deliver the waste to sites located in different Pennsylvania counties.
In refusing to strike down the ordinance, the court noted the
County's arguments distinguishing this case from Carbone. First,
the ordinance pertained only to waste generated in the County, not
to waste generated elsewhere. Second, the haulers were not disposing of waste at out-of-state facilities. Third, the County, in
designating a site, did not negotiate with one favored company, but
used a bidding process open to interstate business. Fourth, the ordinance allowed the designation of out of state facilities. Finally,
the purpose of the ordinance was not purely economic, as it was
passed in response to a state act requiring waste disposal plans.
The basis of the court's decision rested on the fact that the haulers
had failed to establish that they or anyone else were engaged in
interstate commerce or that interstate commerce was affected in
any way. The court mentioned that the waste was neither picked
up nor disposed of in other states, factors which were present in
Carbone.
A case being watched very closely at the time of this writing is
Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling v. Atlantic County Board of
Freeholders,196 on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. Oral arguments were heard in September, 1994, and
a decision is expected shortly. This is the first post-Carbone flow
control case to reach the circuit court level on its merits. Moreover, the fact that it is in the Third Circuit, which upheld a New
Jersey flow control regulation in 1988, makes it all the more interesting. The challenge brought in the case deals with New Jersey's
comprehensive solid waste management scheme, in which the state
has effectively treated disposal service providers as utilities and retained control over solid waste management. 197 Solid waste management districts in New Jersey submit and continually amend and
update solid waste management plans to the state for approval.
195. No. 34 C.D. (Pa. 1994).

196. No. 94-5173.
197. See generally N.J.S.A. § 13:1E-1-207 (1991 & Supp. 1994) (The Solid Waste
Management Act); N.J.S.A. § 48:13A-1-13 (Solid Waste Utility Control Act); N.J.S.A.
§ 13:1D-1 (1991 & Supp. 1993) (treating entities involved in waste disposal to be public utilities).
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New Jersey regulations permit such plans to include flow control
provisions, 98 and such provisions are integral to district plans,
more so than in other jurisdictions. In this case, the district controlled the flow of construction and demolition debris, preventing a
Philadelphia business from receiving the waste in part because of
the plan's recycling requirement.
The district court could not find a likelihood of success on the
merits, but its decision was issued prior to Carbone. After Carbone, however, in a different case, that same court effectively refused to apply Carbone, not wanting to invite the chaos that could
result from a decision that would disturb the foundation of a complex, longstanding solid waste management system and potentially
affect the municipal debt supporting the system.199 The court
stated it would look for guidance from the Third Circuit, referring
to Atlantic Coast, regarding whether the differences between the
New Jersey system and the Clarkstown system are sufficient to result in a different finding.2° If the Third Circuit does uphold the
New Jersey scheme, it would not be surprising to see the case appealed to the Supreme Court. When faced with the different consequences involved in Atlantic Coast, the Court might find it more
difficult to invalidate flow control provisions that are so integral to
a state's ability to provide for the public health and safety.
V.

Evading Carbone:Four Available Alternatives for Local
Governments

The legal status of legislative flow control is in a state of flux, and
it appears that flow control ordinances are generally unenforceable
at this time. As a result, local governments that have traditionally
relied on legislative flow control, or at least the threat of such flow
control, to support municipally owned or sponsored waste management facilities have been forced to turn to alternative means for
causing waste to be delivered to their facilities. Because the Carbone decision on its face does not address non-legislative forms of
flow control, there remain four viable alternative methods that
should withstand Commerce Clause challenges by which local governments can ensure that waste is delivered to the desired facilities.
They are: municipal hauling, contract flow control, franchise flow
control and economic flow control. The only real question is
198. N.J.A.C. § 7:26-6.5.
199. Borough of Haddon Heights v. Shinn, No. 94-CV-2753, at 13-16 (D.N.J. June
6, 1994).
200. Id. at 18.
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whether municipal governments have the political will to implement these methods to achieve public goals that are not now being
supported by private hauling interests.
A.

Flow Control by Municipal Haulage

Of the four, the method least likely to be judicially assailed is
municipal waste collection. If a municipality collects municipal
solid waste through the use of municipal vehicles and municipal
employees, it is indisputable that the municipality can then control
where that waste is disposed, just as private haulers have contended on their own behalf. Thus, to achieve flow control, all a
local government need do is take over collection of all waste.
It is unlikely that a challenge to a municipality's right to engage
in such services would be successful. Municipal waste collection
monopolization has been consistently upheld in the courts against a
variety of challenges. 20 1 The only argument that could potentially
succeed, however, is a Carbone-based contention that, should the
municipality attempt to exclude all competition from private haulers, it would be impermissibly regulating interstate commerce. A
broad reading of Carbone, perhaps following the logic in MidAmerican or Pine Ridge,2"2 could be used to argue that municipal
monopolization of waste collection results in out-of-state businesses being denied access to the local waste market. This sort of
reading, however, disregards traditional waste management practices. Historically, local governments have been considered ulti20 3
mately responsible for protecting the public's health and safety.
In many jurisdictions, this has been codified in municipal home
rule and other police power provisions .2 °0 Accordingly, municipalities in the past have provided solid waste collection services to
their constituents, either by virtue of police power authorizations
or statutes specifically addressing solid waste management. To ignore this historic responsibility would result in chaos for all governmental services.
201. See, e.g., City of Rochester v. Gutberlett, 211 N.Y. 309 (1914); Ex parte
Zhizhuzza, 147 Cal. 328 (1905). See generally 83 A.L.R. 2d 799, § 5 (discussing a mu-

nicipality's ability to exclude private waste removal services).
202. See supra note 191.
203. See 83 A.L.R. 2d 799, § 5.

204. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 5(a),(7) (1976 & Supp. 1994) (the "municipal
affairs" doctrine and general police power authority over sanitation); N.Y. CONST. art.
IX, § 2(c)(10) (McKinney 1987) and N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law art. 2, § 10(1)(ii)

(a)(12) (McKinney 1987) (enabling local governments to provide for the public safety,
health and well-being).
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Through municipal collection, a local government can most easily ensure that waste will be delivered where the government prefers. Engaging in municipal collection, however, involves a great
commitment of resources and an increase in potential liabilities on
account of the active role of the municipality. With this in mind,
the majority of local governments have chosen not to engage in
municipal collection, particularly collection of commercial waste.
Nevertheless, should other forms of flow control fail, local governments can always support their facilities by "biting the bullet" and
transporting the waste themselves.
B.

Contract Flow Control

Given the attendant costs and burdens of municipal collection,
some local governments have chosen to engage in a different
method of controlling the disposal of waste-contract flow control.
Contract flow control is achieved when a local government effectively monopolizes solid waste collection and then contracts out to
one or more haulers to provide collection services on behalf of the
municipality. The contract typically includes a negotiated provision, voluntarily agreed to by the hauler, in which the municipality
designates a disposal site or reserves to itself the ability to do so in
the future. The Carbonedecision did not address this form of flow
control, and it appears that contractually designating a disposal site
differs significantly from the ordinance struck down in the case.
One key difference is the voluntary nature of the contractual
flow control provision. The contract is a mutually voluntary agreement entered into by the local government and the hauler. Presumably, the hauler is able to negotiate the flow control provision
and is under no obligation to enter into the contract. Because the
hauler receives the benefit of its bargain, this situation differs from
the unilaterally imposed rules and regulations of legislative flow
control.
Additionally, if the premise of a local government being entitled
to take over waste collection for itself is accepted under the reasoning in Carbone, then contractual flow control must be accepted as
well. In that vein, a municipality is doing nothing more than monopolizing and privatizing the municipal function of solid waste collection and, in so doing, it is setting forth the terms and conditions
under which the private company may assume this governmental
power. Monopolization and privatization decisions, implemented
through voluntary agreements, should not be subject to Commerce
Clause review.
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In fact, this sort of analysis is suggestive of the type made by the
Supreme Court in a 1983 case, which continued the development of
the market participant doctrine. 2 5 In White v. Massachusetts
Council of Construction Employers, Inc.,2° the City of Boston required, as a condition of receiving a city construction contract, that
the contractor's workforce include at least 50 percent bona fide
Boston residents.2 °7 The Court found that because the City used
city funds to employ the contractor, it was acting as a market participant. As a result, the Court ruled that the facially discriminatory contract requirement should not be analyzed under the
Commerce Clause and thus was not problematic.
Although not exactly congruent, the White fact pattern is analogous to a contract flow control scheme. If a local government is
expending its funds to hire a private contractor to perform a municipal function, Commerce Clause challenges are not likely to be
accepted by courts. With contract flow control, a local government
pays, under a contract, an independent contractor to perform the
service of collecting waste on behalf of the municipality. As a condition to the contract, the contractor is required to comply with the
local government's choice of a disposal site. This condition,
although perhaps discriminatory, is imposed by, the municipality as
a market participant and thus should not be subject to Commerce
Clause analysis.
As mentioned above, Carbone, which invalidated a flow control
provision imposed by regulatory means, did not address this
method of effecting flow control, a method that is achieved without
the use of the regulatory powers of the local government. The extension of Carbone to this form of privatization of solid waste collection services appears questionable at best.
C. Franchise Flow Control
A third form of flow control that remains viable following Carbone is franchise flow control, a variation of contract flow control
that may be considered a more secure method of ensuring the delivery of waste to a designated site. A franchise flow control
205. For a more detailed discussion of the market participation doctrine, see supra
note 128. Unlike in Waste Recycling, Inc., discussed supra note 124, a municipality
contracting for collection services is indeed engaged in business in the market, rather
than merely regulating a market to its advantage. If a private business contracted
with a hauler and included a flow control provision, it is likely that no question would
be raised. None should be raised when a municipality does so either.
206. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
207. Id. at 206.
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scheme incorporates the voluntary nature and market participant
status associated with contract flow control, while adding important regulatory aspects in exchange for the acquisition of a "property right" by the hauler. Franchising appears to be the least
intrusive and most balanced means by which to attempt to achieve
flow control, and has the added benefit of enabling the government
to avoid the administrative hassles of paying the haulers, as typically occurs under a collection contract. Direct payment is not necessary because, in a franchise scheme, the hauler bills its customers,
known as ratepayers, directly for its collection services.
Generally, a governmental franchise is a special privilege,
granted by the government to individuals or corporations, that had
not existed and does not belong to the individual or corporation as
a matter of right;208 the governmental franchise is vested only by a
grant of sovereign power by the government. 2°1 1pically,
franchises concern such services and functions that the government
itself is obligated to furnish to its citizens. Franchises also involve
the right to use the public streets and ways to deliver these services
to the general public.210 For example, utility companies are often
granted franchises to provide utility service on behalf of the government. Part of that franchise grant is a right to use the public
streets and ways in order to, for example, lay sewer pipes or electrical wires. Similarly, a grant of a solid waste collection franchise is a
grant by a government to authorize one or more private companies
to provide solid waste collection services on behalf of the government. Along with the authorization conferred, the government
also grants the haulers the right to use the public streets and ways
to collect and transport the solid waste.
The ability of local governments to grant franchises for solid
waste collection is typically derived from state statutes, 211 but the
extent and conditions of such franchises are also the result of a
municipality's ability to take over solid waste collection and monopolize such services in itself. As with contract flow control, the
government's inherent power to act for the protection of the public
health and safety and to suspend private competition creates the
means by which a local government can impose flow control. A
franchise's status as a grant from the government is a result of the
fact that the government holds all powers and authority in the field
208. See 36 AM. JUR. 2D. 719, 723 (1968).
209. Id. at 722.
210. Id. at 723, 725.
211. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 40059(a) (1986 & Supp. 1994).
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for which the franchise is granted.212 Thus, the franchisee receives
only those powers given by the government. As noted earlier, if a
municipality provided collection services itself on an exclusive basis, it clearly would be able to direct the waste to designated
places.213 By reserving this power to itself when it grants a waste
collection franchise, the government, as the 214
monopolizing entity,
control.
flow
impose
to
authority
the
retains
By its nature, of a franchise is different from a mere license 215 to
do business or a contract for services. A franchise is generally considered property and, as a result, the grantee has vested rights
under the franchise, which are protected by state and federal constitutions.216 A franchise, however, also constitutes a contract between the government and the grantee, and becomes binding as
such once the grantee accepts the terms and conditions of the grant
from the government.21 7 Typically, the terms and conditions of the
franchise are spelled out in a franchise agreement,2 18 a contract
voluntarily entered into by both the government and the grantee.
This concept of the franchise as a contract leads back to the earlier discussion of contract flow control, 219 but when considered in
connection with the idea of franchise-as-property-right, it gives
franchise flow control another dimension. The privileges received
by the hauler as a grantee and their protected status under state
and federal constitutions bestow on haulers greater legal rights
than under a typical contract. As a result, in negotiating the terms
212. 36 AM.

JUR.

2D. at 722-723.

213. See supra notes 68-70.
214. Id. at 726 (noting that sovereigns granting franchises can, so far as the
franchise affects the public, prescribe the conditions and terms on which it is held).
215. See generally 36 AM. JUR. 2D., at 724 (noting, in part, that a license is a temporary, personal privilege, "while a franchise is neither personal nor temporary, and, it is

not [ordinarily] revocable at the mere will of the grantor.").
216. Id. at 726-27. As discussed therein, a franchise is a property right protected by
the Constitution from arbitrary revocation, impairment or destruction. See Hamilton

Mfg. Co. v. Massachusetts, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 632 (1867). The owner has the same
protection as the owner of any other property. See Conway v. Taylor, 66 U.S. (1
Black) 603 (1861).
217. See 36 AM. JUR. 2D., at 728-30. As discussed therein, a franchise is the subject
of a contract and generally the obligation of the grantee to comply with the terms and

conditions of the grant constitutes sufficient consideration.
218. The use of a franchise agreement, although common, is not always necessary.
"The well-established rule as to franchises is that where a municipal corporation, acting within its powers, enacts an ordinance conferring rights and privileges on a person
or corporation, and the grantee accepts the ordinance and expends money in availing
itself of the rights and privileges so conferred, a contract is thereby created ... ." 36
AM. JUR. 2D., at 728-29.
219. See supra part V.B.
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of the franchise agreement, the local government provides substantial consideration to the hauler and, in return, can more easily insist
on the terms and conditions necessary to accomplish the flow control goals of the government.
In a solid waste collection franchising scheme, the government
can choose to create an exclusive, nonexclusive or partially exclusive franchise. Exclusive franchises contain an additional element
of consideration given by the government-the exclusivity of the
grant. Exclusive franchisees are assured that they are the only
haulers authorized to operate in the designated area. Although
there is no competition, the franchisees are typically more closely
regulated, especially with regard to the rates charged. Nonexclusive franchisees are obviously subject to competition, but usually
all nonexclusive franchisees are subject to similar regulation by the
government. The competitive element of nonexclusive franchises
is an appealing aspect because they are less likely to be attacked as
restricting competition. Nevertheless, the similarity with a mere licensing program, where the local government permits several haulers to operate in the same area, may make the flow control
provisions contained in nonexclusive franchises more likely to be
challenged as a form of regulatory flow control. Partially exclusive
franchises allow competitive hauling among a limited number of
authorized franchisees. In California, a state that relies heavily on
franchising solid waste collection services, 220 municipalities generally utilize an exclusive franchising program; many localities, however, are considering partially exclusive or nonexclusive franchises
as the least disruptive means of gaining greater control over the
waste collection and disposal activities of private haulers.
Another interesting aspect of franchising solid waste collection
services is the issue of who charges the ratepayers. Typically, as
mentioned earlier, the franchisee collects from the customers based
on a rate schedule contained in the franchise, but this is not the
only or most advisable method of rate collection. For example, in
Anaheim, California, the franchise agreement was structured such
that the city collects from the ratepayers and then, under the terms
of the franchise agreement, pays the haulers. The main disadvantage of allowing the haulers to charge its customers directly is that
220. See, e.g., Orange County Code § 4-3-56 (solid waste in the unincorporated ar-

eas of the county shall be collected by franchised haulers on an exclusive basis); Los
Angeles Municipal Code § 66.08.1 (contemplating the issuance of franchises for rubbish collection); see also Webster, Beverly Hills, California:Evaluatingand Assigning
Franchises,WASTE AGE, Jan. 1995, at 49.
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it means haulers handle the funds. The onus would therefore be on
the government if concerns arise over a hauler's rate-charging
practices or its performance under the franchise. In contrast, if the
government collects the fees from ratepayers, it gives the government a great deal of power with respect to flow control challenges.
As the municipality would have the money, it could use it as a
means of assuring that the haulers follow the terms of the
franchise, including any flow control provisions. This method of
collection, however, is administratively difficult to employ in jurisdictions where nonexclusive franchisees operate, on account of the
variety of rates charged.
As noted above, Carbone was silent with respect to non-legislative flow control methods. Nevertheless, the regulatory nature of a
franchising program, and the broad language used in the majority
opinion, have caused some concern regarding the constitutionality
of a solid waste collection franchising scheme. The main purpose
of any solid waste collection franchising program is to provide generally for the safe and efficient collection and disposal of solid
waste. There may, however, be questions about whether this is still
possible given certain language in Carbone,specifically, the Court's
citation of Buck v. Kuykendall.221 Buck is a 1925 -U.S. Supreme
Court decision that struck down a Washington statute prohibiting
common carriers from using state highways over certain routes
without a certificate of public convenience. The Buck Court stated
that the primary purpose of the law "is not regulation with a view
to safety or to conservation of the highways, but the prohibition of
competition. It determines not the manner of use, but the persons
by whom the highways may be used. It prohibits such use to some
persons while permitting it to others for the same purpose and in
'222
the same manner.
This quote was cited at the end of the Carboneopinion and may
generate concern respecting the validity of franchises in an interstate transportation/flow control context. 223 What must be kept in
mind, however, is that the public health and safety concerns with
respect to the collection and transportation of solid waste are arguably much greater than those for common carriers. Even if
franchises are viewed merely as regulatory measures to protect the
public health and safety, it cannot be said that such measures are
adopted merely to prohibit competition. Rather, as a U.S. District
221. 114 S. Ct. at 1684 (citing 267 U.S. 307 (1925)).
222. 267 U.S. at 315-16.

223. 114 S. Ct. at 1684 (citation omitted).
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Court recently stated, there are clear environmental benefits to restricting the movement of solid waste, "as anyone who has driven
behind a waste truck knows. ' 224 In addition to limiting the use of
the roads for aesthetic reasons, an argument similar to that used in
the common carrier case,2z franchises also enable the municipalities to protect the public health and safety from the more serious
problems by nature associated with the collection and transport of
solid waste, such as garbage leaking out of trucks and hauling vehicles causing delays in traffic. The "regulations" used in franchise
flow control are merely the means by which the government acts;
they are not being used actively to regulate the market, as with
legislative flow control.
In addition to issues raised by the language of Carbone, there
may be some question concerning the voluntary nature of franchise
agreements and, more specifically, the flow control provisions contained therein. It might be argued that such agreements could be
considered contracts of adhesion, in other words, that the flow control provisions are forced on haulers that are unable to refuse the
terms. As discussed earlier, however, the monopolistic powers of
local governments in the solid waste management realm provide a
means by which such terms may be justified. Although the
franchisor may "insist" on a flow control provision as part of a
waste collection contract or franchise, an agreement containing
such a provision is not "involuntary" in nature because what a government is doing through the grant of a franchise, and the determination of the terms thereof, is exercising a latent power to take
over the collection of solid waste and select the disposal site. With
franchise flow control, the government is not "washing its hands"
of its duty to provide for collection; rather, it has actually taken
over collection pursuant to its authority and has chosen to contract
out, as with any other governmental service. It is not abdicating its
responsibility or powers in this field; rather, it is just performing
the function and providing the service in what it has determined is
the most beneficial manner for the public. With legislative flow
control, this sort of governmental assumption of responsibility in
connection with the authority to monopolize is simply not present.
Franchising thus gives a balanced approach to flow control,
which may be more acceptable to both governments and haulers.
Governments are able to retain some control over the haulers
without having to pay the haulers directly. Haulers are less likely
224. Atlantic Coast, No. 94-5173, at 43.

225. See supra note 222.
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to object to franchising than municipal collection or putting collection contracts out to bid because they have more of an opportunity
to negotiate the terms of their grant and have greater security in
their rights. In addition to these benefits, franchises can be used to
assist in' achieving economic flow control, the fourth alternative
available to local governments seeking to control the flow of solid
waste.
D.

Economic Flow Control

A fourth form of flow control, and one which should be very
likely to withstand Commerce Clause analysis, is economic flow
control. Economic flow control is achieved when haulers deliver
solid waste to a facility because the costs of disposal at the facility,
including transportation costs and tipping fees, are less than or
comparable to those at alternative disposal sites.
At governmentally-owned solid waste management facilities, especially those financed through the issuance of debt instruments,
the tipping fee is usually greater than at competing privatelyowned facilities because of the additional waste-related programs
that are funded through the landfill tipping fee. Also, landfills are
a generally cheaper means of disposal than technology-laden, capital-intensive incinerators or materials recovery facilities (MRFs).
Thus, in order to attract waste, the government will need to lower
its tipping fee, while continuing to derive revenues sufficient to pay
operating costs, debt service and other expenses associated with
the facility. The difference between the costs of the facility and the
tipping fees charged can be financed in a variety of ways. For example, as suggested by Justice Kennedy in the Carbone majority
opinion, the government can issue general obligation debt instruments or raise taxes to supply the difference.226 These types of decisions, however, are often politically unpalatable for local
governments. Instead, governments can turn to more attractive alternatives, including the use of generator fees and franchise fees to
fund the facilities.
The generator fee concept involves the charging of a solid waste
fee by a governmental unit to its generator constituency, i.e., the
residences and businesses that produce solid waste. This is typically accomplished through the local tax bill. Often, the entity
charging the fee simply attaches its fee to a taxing entity's tax bill
226. 114 S. Ct. 1684 (citing New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269
(1988)).
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as a separate line item. For example, a county may charge a fee for
solid waste services it provides, yet the fee can be collected through
tax bills sent out by town government. Or, a public authority may
be authorized to impose fees, and it can charge those fees through
the governmental tax bill. 227 The advantage of the separate line
item approach is that the increase in payments made by citizens
can be traced by each citizen directly to the solid waste enterprise,
making it less objectionable to the taxing entities. This also avoids
the difficult decision to raise taxes. The money derived from these
fees is then applied to finance some of the costs of operations at
the solid waste facility, and thus enable the owner to lower the tipping fee. The lower tipping fee should make it economically efficient for haulers in the area to dispose of their waste at the facility.
Furthermore, the additional payment by citizens may be offset because, in theory, the lower tipping fee charged to haulers should be
passed through to the customers of the haulers.22 ' Thus, although
the customers pay a new solid waste fee, they receive what should
be a commensurate benefit in reduced payments to haulers. Nothing requires the haulers to deliver waste to a less expensive publicly
owned disposal site, however, and if a hauler owns a competing
landfill or other facility, the hauler is free to utilize its own facility
even though it may be more costly.
The basis for charging the solid waste fee depends on the jurisdiction. In many cases, local governments and public authorities
are authorized to charge fees only for the use of waste management facilities or for services rendered by such facilities.2 29 These
are known as user fees and often are restricted to amounts reasonably related to the costs incurred at the facility. By nature, user
fees are usually only chargeable to actual users of the facility.
Thus, if a particular person's waste is not going to a facility, it may
be difficult to impose a user fee for that facility on that person. To
avoid this problem, governments can try to impose a "capacity
fee." Capacity fees are based on the premise that the governmental owner of a facility is making the facility available to all persons
in the jurisdiction, effectively reserving capacity for them. Some
227. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW § 2045-e(14) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (authorizing the listing of a lien on the local government's tax bills for overdue fees charged
by the Onondaga County Resource Recovery Agency).

228. This scenario applies mainly in situations in which haulers directly bill their
customers. If the jurisdiction operates under a collection contract in which the government pays the haulers and bills the citizens, reductions can be made in taxes or other

charges to compensate for the new solid waste fee.
229. See, ,e.g., N.Y. PUB. AuTH.

LAW

§ 2045-e(14) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
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jurisdictions specifically authorize such capacity fees.230 In most jurisdictions, however, it would have to be argued, in order to justify
the capacity fee, that the availability of waste management services
at a facility plus the benefit to the entire community for having
such services available to others constitute a "use" of the facility.
In that sense, a "user" is someone who receives a benefit from a
231
solid waste facility or system.
Another means to achieve this sort of economic flow control is,
as mentioned earlier, through the franchising system. The municipality granting the franchise may be able to charge a franchise fee
to the grantee, to be used to finance costs at the facility. Typically,
this fee, which can be a flat fee or based on gross profits or possibly
tonnage collected, is paid in consideration for the rights and privileges granted in the franchise.232 Because the franchise terms are
often negotiated, the validity of the fee is difficult to question,233
but governments often try to relate the fee to the "burden" placed
on the municipality by the exercise of the franchise. 234 The
franchise fee imposed by the government will no doubt be passed
through to the customers, but the lower tipping fees paid by the
haulers can be required in franchises to be passed through as well.
This should result in a form of rough justice for the ratepaying
customers.
Economic flow control should be a constitutionally viable
method under Carbone, because it does not involve any regulation
of haulers. Nevertheless, despite the language in Carboneregarding the use of taxes or general obligation debt to finance facilities, a
post-Carbonecase in Ohio found that a generator fee imposed to
achieve economic flow control could be considered to violate the
Commerce Clause. This decision, Mid-American Waste Systems,
Inc. v. Fisher,235 although ill-founded, should serve as a warning to
230. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 2053-g (McKinney Supp. 1994) (authorizing
the Rockland County Solid Waste Management Authority to fix and collect fees and
charges for the use of its facilities and services rendered, including the availability

thereof).
231. This is similar to the concept in many jurisdictions of water and sewer charges
to those who do not actually use the water or sewer systems, but are required to
"hook up," and is premised on the idea that there is a benefit to all by having such
systems. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. § 40:56-52 (West Supp. 1994); Id. at §§ 40A:2EA-10 to -14
(West Supp. 1994); N.Y. TowN LAW §§ 198(1)(g)-(k), 201, 202 & 202-a (McKinney
1968).
232. See 36 AM. JUR. 2D., at 747.
233. Id. at 747-49.
234. For example, franchise fees can be justified as compensating the government
for administrative costs, for the use of the public streets and for aesthetic burdens.
235. No. C-2-94-493 (S.D. Ohio May 31, 1994) (discussed supra note 178).
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local governments about how the language in Carbone can be
stretched by those who wish to prevent any form of flow control.
VI. Garbage In, Garbage Out: Congress Gets Involved
A.

Background

In response to Carbone, municipal interests have lobbied Congress to take action to authorize flow control once again.236 With
huge amounts of public waste management facility debt currently
outstanding, 2 7 local governments have been very concerned about
the risk of default on these revenue-backed issues. Additionally,
municipalities who have not relied on legislative flow control, but
may have relied on the threat of such, are now faced with haulers
who have the freedom to take the waste wherever they prefer. The
haulers' decisions are naturally made with an eye on their profits.
Local governments, however, are concerned about their potential
liabilities in the future, protecting the public health and safety, and
meeting waste diversion goals established by state governments. If
it is cheaper for a hauler to take recyclables to a landfill, it may
now be difficult to convince the hauler to take them to a MRF. As
discussed in Part II, the lack of flow control may also hinder municipalities' ability to plan for the long term with respect to solid waste
management. These and other arguments have been presented to
the members of Congress on behalf of local governments.
At the same time, the private waste industry has mobilized its
forces to prevent the restoration of full flow control authority. Interests within the industry are divided,238 however, and a variety of
bills with different views were considered by Congress throughout
the summer of 1994. Finally, in mid-August 1994, an initial compromise bill was recommended by the House Energy and Commerce Committee and passed by the House on September 29,
1994.239 This bill, H.R. 4683, a proposed amendment to Subtitle D
of the Solid Waste Disposal Act,24 was sponsored by Representative Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ). The Pallone bill did not come to a
236..See Agreement Abounds: Existing Flow Control Laws Merit Grandfathering,
July 14, 1994, at 5.
237. During the Congressional debates over flow control it was estimated that $18
billion in municipal debt supporting waste management facilities was outstanding. 140
CONG. REc. H10,307 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Minge).
238. See 140 CONG. REC. H10,312 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Richardson).
239. H.R. 4683, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 140 CONG. REC. H10,320, H10,320 (1994).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 6941.
THE BOND BUYER,
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vote in the Senate; instead, it served as the basis for S. 2345,241 the
bill which was the subject of a Senate vote. The Senate had attempted to link the flow control measures of the Pallone bill with a
waste import restriction bill, different versions of which had passed
both branches of Congress.2 42 The new bill, S. 2345, also contained
several compromises by municipal interests that were not included
in the Pallone bill, including an effective prohibition on future flow
control except with respect to certain grandfathered facilities.
Nevertheless, in an effort to obtain some form of authorization for
flow control to protect outstanding debt, the House passed this bill
on the final Friday of the session.243 But with time running out,
and unanimous consent required, S. 2345 was defeated in the Senate when one Rhode Island senator objected to a portion of the bill
concerning the waste import restrictions. 244 Given the amount of
progress made towards a workable compromise and the in-depth
consideration that occurred during the final months of the session,
a waste bill, either as combined legislation or simply as a flow control measure, will likely be considered again by the full Congress
during 1995.245
B. The Pallone Approach
The Pallone bill 246 addresses flow control authority over three
types of waste-residential waste, nonresidential waste and recyclable materials. Generally, the bill permits residential flow control
in the future, provided the political subdivision has established a
source separation program,2 47 but prohibits future flow control of
nonresidential waste except as "grandfathered" in the bill.2 48 Nonresidential waste flow control is grandfathered only in those communities that, prior to May 15, 1994, have designated a facility for
241. S. 2345, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 140 CONG. REC. S10,220 (1994).

242. Id.
243. S. 2345, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 140 CONG. REC. Hll,401, H1l,407 (1994).
244. Flow Control Coalition to Push Bill During Lame Duck Session, 25 SOLID
WASTE REPORT 367-68 (Nov. 17, 1994).
245. On the first day of the new session, three flow control bills were introduced in
the House of Representatives, including one by Rep. Pallone. See H.R. 24, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 225, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 342, 104th Cong.,

1st Sess. (1995).
246. Because S. 2345 resulted from last minute negotiations and contains numerous

compromises which may not be continued in the next version considered by Congress,
this Article will use the Pallone bill, H.R. 4683, as a basis for its discussion of the
Congressional approach to authorize legislative flow control. The Authors believe
municipal interests would not be served by agreeing to go forward with S. 2345.
247. H.R. 4683, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ (a)(1) & (b)(2)(1994).
248. Id. at § (f)(1)(C).
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nonresidential waste or had "committed" to such designation.249
The word "committed" is defined to require governmental action
to implement the designation decision, for example, legally binding
contracts, solicitation of proposals, purchase of land, or other actions to develop the facility to be designated. 250 As for recyclable
materials, except for already existing contracts, no recyclable material can be controlled unless individuals or entities voluntarily relinquish such material to the local government.251
1. Residential Waste
H.R. 4683 permits the future flow control of residential waste so
long as certain conditions are met. To exercise flow control authority over residential waste, a political subdivision will have to establish a source separation program for recyclable materials and will
have to hold at least one public hearing in which it finds that it is
necessary to exercise flow control authority over the waste to meet
its current or anticipated solid waste management needs. 25 2 Additionally, the political subdivision will have to provide a written explanation of its findings on that matter.253 As a further
requirement, a competitive designation process, as discussed below, must be utilized.5 4 This process must result in the designation
of a disposal site based on the standards set forth in the bill, including engaging in an open competitive process.
Nonresidential Waste
To engage in flow control of nonresidential waste, the political
subdivision will have to fit within one of the Grandfathering provisions set forth in the bill. The "hard grandfathering" provision
grandfathers laws, ordinances, regulations, solid waste management plans and legally binding provisions adopted before May 15,
1994, which apply to the transportation, management or disposal of
municipal solid waste to a proposed or existing facility designated
prior to May 15, 1994.56 In other words, if the political subdivision
legislated flow control to a designated facility before May 15, 1994,
it will continue to be able to flow control that type of waste to that

2.

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at §§ (a)(2)(A) & (B).
H.R. 4683 at § (i)(8).
Id. at § (a)(3).
Id. at § (b)(2).
Id. at § (B)(ii).
H.R. 4683 at § (c).
Id.

256. Id. at § (f)(1)(C).
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facility. Any change in the facility designated appears to require
undertaking a competitive designation process.
The bill also contains in section (a)(2)(B) a "soft grandfathering"
provision for non-residential waste, permitting a local government
to exercise flow control authority if, prior to May 15, 1994, it has
adopted a law, ordinance, regulation, solid waste management plan
or legally binding provision that "identified the use of 1 or more
waste management methods that will be necessary for the transportation, management or disposal of municipal solid waste generated
within its boundaries, and committed to the designation of 1 or
'257
more waste management facilities for that method or methods.
"Committed to the designation.. ." is defined in the bill to mean
that, prior to May 15, 1994, the local government was "legally
bound" to designate a facility, or performed one or more of the
following actions for the purpose of such a designation:
(A) Solicitation of proposals for designation of a facility;
(B) Purchase of land for the facility to be designated;
(C) Execution of a legally binding contract or franchise agreement for waste collection services expressly for the delivery
of waste to a waste management facility to be designated;
or
(D) Other action since January 1, 1993, that evidences recent
significant financial commitment for the
continuing devel25
opment of a facility to be designated.
These standards for committing to designate a facility are somewhat arbitrary and certainly vague. They also represent vastly different stages of the solid waste management facility procurement
process. The weakness of the bill is evident here for other reasons
as well. For example, solicitation of proposals for designation of a
facility is a limiting example, one that may not adequately describe
important and costly steps taken by many governments. Local governments seeking to become self-sufficient with respect to solid
waste management services will not issue requests for proposals
(RFPs) for the designation of a facility. Rather, the RFPs will be
for proposals to construct and operate a facility on behalf of the
government. This is but one example of how the bill may fail to
account for differences in procurement processes around the
country.
257. Id. at § (a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
258. H.R. 4683 at § (i)(8).
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Also, under the Pallone provisions, the grandfather exemption
for nonresidential waste "sunsets" after five years, 259 meaning that
unless a local government has designated a facility within a fiveyear period, the grandfather coverage would expire. All other
public and private contracts existing prior to May 15, 1994, will be
grandfathered for the remainder of their terms, but the bill is silent
regarding the future of waste systems that have relied on such
contracts. 26
An important limitation of the bill that should not be overlooked
is that the grandfathering provision is limited in scope because the
local government can flow control only the same type of waste it
had flow controlled prior to May 15, 1994.261 For example, if the
community- was grandfathered for only compostable materials
prior to May 15, 1994, it could not flow control other materials in
the future. To the extent that the local government is
grandfathered for flow controlling nonresidential municipal solid
waste, however, the bill permits the local government to flow control "such solid waste from any existing management
facility to any
'262
other existing future waste management facility.

3.

Competitive Designation Process
One significant difficulty for municipalities contained in the Pallone bill is the competitive designation process,263 which applies to
all attempts to exercise the flow control authority in the bill, except
for laws that are "hard grandfathered," i.e., laws actually designating a facility prior to May 15, 1994. The goals of the competitive
designation process must include capacity assurance and the protection of the public health and safety. 264 The process must be an
open competitive process with specified criteria for selection of the
facilities to be designated.265 One problem with the bill is that it
appears that even "hard grandfathered" local governments will
have to go through the competitive designation process if they seek
to designate a different facility. The real concern is that, although
it is not clear, it seems that such a process must be implemented
even if the local government wishes to designate its own, alreadyconstructed, publicly-financed facility. To require a municipality to
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at § (b)(4).
Id. at §§ (f)(1)(A) & (B).
Id. at § (b)(3).
H.R. 4683 at § (a), 1 3.
Id. at § (c).
Id.
Id.
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go through a competitive designation process, after having expended valuable time and resources and having engaged in an extensive planning process, would seem inequitable and unjust at
best.
4.

Criticisms of the Pallone Bill
As mentioned earlier, one of the chief concerns governments
should have with the Pallone bill is that many of the provisions do
not harmonize with some existing solid waste management programs and procurement processes. This can be traced to several
factors. First, and most obviously, the bill was sponsored by a representative from New Jersey, a state with a unique method of solid
waste management. As discussed earlier,266 in New Jersey, the
state retains control over solid waste management practices. The
state delineates solid waste management districts (usually the
counties) and requires them to file and amend periodically solid
waste management plans, which must be approved by the state and
become as binding as a statute.267 Flow control is achieved through
these solid waste management plans, in which the state grants a
disposal franchise to a facility, the only means by which a New
268
Jersey entity is permitted to receive waste.
When read against the solid waste system in New Jersey, the provisions of the Pallone bill make much more sense. Specifically, the
use of the term "solid waste management plan" is clearly a result of
the New Jersey influence, because in New Jersey such plans are the
chosen means of implementing flow control. Other jurisdictions
also have "solid waste management plans," but the term is used
differently. In other states, the term does not mean a binding provision that controls solid waste management with the effect of a
statute, but rather it refers to a general study of solid waste management options and the policy document created as a result. Such
plans do not have the weight of a law which controls both governments and private companies engaged in various aspects of solid
waste management in the jurisdiction, as is the case in New Jersey.
An additional concern is the compromising nature of the bill.
Because the 103d Congress focused on issues other than waste flow
control in its final few months, those members of Congress actually
involved in the flow control issue basically left it to the govern266. See supra note 197.
267. See N.J.S.A. § 13:1E-1, -207 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (Solid Waste Management Act).
268. See N.J.S.A. § 13:1E-27 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
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ments and the waste industry to fashion a compromise that would
then be presented for Congressional approval. With the waste industry holding the upper hand, on account of greater funding and
the Carbone decision, however, much of the bill favors industry
interests. For example, future flow control of commercial waste is
essentially not allowed.269 In addition, recyclables are extremely
unlikely to be controllable.270 In general, the hoops through which
a government must jump to continue a designation process make it
extremely costly to engage in flow control of any type of waste.
Basically, the bill is structured to phase out flow control gradually, protecting, as a concession to investors, facilities that have relied on flow control in the past. It seems clear that the only issues
on which the waste industry was willing to compromise were residential waste and facilities for which substantial monies were spent
in expectation of being able to implement legislative flow control,
essentially facilities financed with revenue bonds backed by flow
control ordinances. These problems were exacerbated in S. 2345,
which would not permit flow control of residential waste in the future, 271 and sought to abolish contract and franchise flow control as
well,272 although it did expand the definition of "commited to the
273
designation.
Despite these shortcomings, it may be possible to solve some
problems with the Pallone bill in a revised version in the current
session. For example, the bill is unclear in its definitions as to
whether sludge is considered a municipal solid waste,274 yet under
RCRA, the act this bill would amend, sludge is defined to be a
municipal solid waste.275 Additionally, the bill needs more examples of what constitutes "committing" to the designation of a facility, including put-or-pay contracts and steps towards construction
of a facility.2 76 If a municipality has already made significant commitments towards resolving waste management problems, the bill
must assure that such a municipality's plans will be covered.
269. Cf. S. 2345, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 140 CONG. REC. H11,407 (1994); and H.R.
4683, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). For a complete discussion, see infra part VI.B.2.
270. See H.R. 4683, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § (a)(3).
271. H.R. 4683, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 11(a).

272. Id. at § II(9)(2)(B).
273. Id. at § II(h)(1).
274. See Id. at § (i)(3)(A).
275. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1983 & Supp. 1994).
276. These have already been included in S.2345, but local governments need to

consider if such changes would be adequate.
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Fundamental Concerns

Regardless of any opportunity to modify H.R. 4683 and S. 2345,
there are two fundamental problems with the Congressional process developing the flow control bills. First, too many waste management systems that are currently operating are left out of the
grandfathering provisions. For example, in California, where many
millions of dollars have been spent to develop waste management
systems to best serve the needs of the public, there has been no
need in the past to rely on legislative flow control, because, effectively, economic flow control existed.277 Relying on this situation,
California has developed one of the most environmentally progressive statewide integrated waste management schemes, including a
diversion rate goal of 50 percent in the near future.278 Without the
threat of legislative flow control, haulers may be able to take the
California waste to temporarily cheaper disposal sites, including
landfills, thereby thwarting the long-term environmental planning
of the municipalities. Without the waste, the California facilities
will lose money, money that is needed to pay off debt incurred for
the facilities as well as to operate the non-facility aspects of a waste
management program (for example, recycling education). This will
endanger the long-term viability of these systems and hinder the
plans of California localities to provide for a stable, self-sufficient,
environmentally sound disposal program.
The most serious concern with respect to the bills being debated
by Congress is the status of the four alternative methods of flow
control discussed earlier. 279 The Pallone bill authorizes the exercise of "flow control authority," which is defined as the authority to
control the movement of solid waste or recyclable materials and
direct their transportation to one or more facilities. ° This provision could be read either to include or exclude the four alternative
means of achieving flow control. If it does include other non-legislative methods, the bill would severely limit a local government's
ability to engage in any form of flow control. A reasonable interpretation of the provision, however, is that municipal hauling and
contract hauling, as forms of flow control that do not involve legislative action of the type described in the bill, should not be covered
277. This observation is based on the firm's experience in servicing numerous clients in California.
278. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code §41780. For an explanation of waste diversion, see
supra notes 63-65.
279. See supra part V.
280. H.R. 4683(i)(1).
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by the Pallone bill. In addition, economic flow control, which is
really an indirect means of achieving flow control that does not
involve actively exercising control over waste movement, likely
would not be covered by the bill. Franchise flow control, which has
a more regulatory aspect, may be more likely to be addressed by
the bill. The attempt to eliminate future franchise flow control in
S. 2345 should also raise some red flags for municipalities. California, for instance, relies heavily on franchising and, as noted earlier,
many local governments could benefit from its implementation. It
should be of paramount importance to local governments not to
lose the ability to engage in these forms of flow control. As discussed in Part V, these methods do not significantly affect interstate commerce and Congress should not heed the waste
management industry's arguments about prohibiting or restricting
their use. All local governments must look closely at the issue as it
is considered again and decide what is best for themselves. Operating without any such law at all should not be discounted.
D.

Import Restrictions

As noted earlier, Congress also addressed a related issue-permitting states to impose restrictions on the import of solid waste by
landfills and incinerators.2 8 ' Clearly, if Congress were to bestow
such authority on states, local governments would have profound
new difficulties in exporting solid waste. With export options limited and likely increasing in cost, the result would be an augmented
reliance on in-state solutions to solid waste management problems,
and perhaps more self-reliance by municipalities. If local governments do choose to sponsor public facilities, they will naturally
want to ensure sufficient waste streams to such facilities, thus causing them to turn to flow control.282
With an import restriction law in effect, flow control would become a more pressing issue for local governments. If a compromise flow control bill limiting prospective flow control is enacted as
well, the four alternative methods-municipal collection, contract
flow control, franchise flow control and economic flow control281. See S. 2345, Title I.
282. The bills passed by the House and Senate each address this matter, and it
remains to be seen in the next session exactly what developments will result. Generally speaking, however, the bills permit state governors to cap imports of municipal
solid waste at 1993 levels or below. Certain allowances are made for host community
agreements and permits that allow for the import of out-of-state waste, as well as
existing contracts between the landfill or incinerator and the out of state waste
supplier.
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should become the methods of choice for ensuring the viability of
waste management facilities.
VI. Conclusion
Garbage will always ultimately be the government's problem.
Evolving environmental standards and state and federal policies
will continue to require reasoned responses from local governments and municipal solid waste flow control is a vital cog in many
jurisdictions' solid waste management solutions. Without flow control of some form, governments' ability to plan and provide for the
most environmentally sound and economically acceptable solutions
will wane, leaving the public vulnerable to the vagaries of a private
market that does not have a duty to protect the public health and
safety. The Carbonedecision has blunted one of the local governments chief weapons-legislative flow control-and it appears
Congress will not supply an adequate answer for many solid waste
systems. More than ever, alternatives to legislative flow control
will be needed to enable municipalities to fulfill their solid waste
duties, to comply with federal and state mandates, and to provide
workable, environmentally-sound, long-term solid waste programs
serving the interests of the public health and safety. Local governments must act soon by examining these options and deciding
which will best serve the public.

